

limits on the deployment of offensive forces, the storage of ammunition, bridging equipment and other logistics needed for offensive operations. But the aim must be to pick out as few elements as possible, just the one or two that are most important, so as to cut through the logjam of resistance and obfuscation that will be thrown up by all those whose lives are built round the existing military structures and arms control rituals.

2. Once the key items have been picked out, the question to be addressed is to what level should the quantity of a chosen item, for example, tanks, be cut in order to achieve security? Should the figure be zero or should it be 5,000 or some other number from the Atlantic to the Urals? The focus should be on the target numbers required to produce greater stability, and agreement should be framed round those target numbers. Discussion of present numbers and the question of whether there is a balance should be avoided like the plague, since it is bound to produce interminable wrangling over unmeasurable differences in quality, age, location and other variables. The talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) are a warning: after nearly fifteen years of negotiation and more than 450 meetings these talks have produced no agreement. If the focus is on the target level, present numbers are relevant only to the question of how many weapons or forces should be scrapped. The same principle applies to the deployment of forces and logistics: the focus should be on the number and dispositions that will create stability, not on the present balance.

### THE CHOICE

If the aims of a nation or alliance are offensive then clearly it must go for offensive superiority. That, for example, is what Hitler did. On the other hand, if your aims are peaceful, there are, as noted earlier, two methods by which you can try to achieve security. One is by having offensive forces with which to deter, meaning frighten, your opponent and so dissuade him from attack. The other is by going for defensive forces (supposing always that there is a choice), so that by achieving defensive superiority you deny your opponent the prospect of attaining his objectives and so dissuade him from attack, whilst alarming him as little as possible — indeed whilst seeking to reassure him.

If you go for offensive forces — or all-round forces of mixed capability — you are likely to alarm your enemy, however much you tell him that your intentions are peaceful. He can never rely 100 percent on any statement of intentions you make. For your intentions may change, or your statement of them may be dishonest, or you may be replaced by someone with different intentions. Your

military capabilities, on the other hand, cannot quickly be changed, and have only limited ambiguity. They are therefore likely to have an important effect on your opponent's perceptions of your aims and on his reactions. You are unlikely to achieve reconciliation, mutual trust and peaceful relations so long as your doctrines and forces have an offensive character.

The decision whether a nation or alliance goes for offensive or defensive doctrines and forces will be subject to complex political influences and pressures. Some arguments will be based on inherited ideas about how to fight wars and how to dissuade your neighbour from attack, expounded by groups who have bureaucratic, economic and professional interests in the existing way of doing things. Other viewpoints, rooted in an opposition to the *status quo*, will be put forward by those who oppose existing policies on moral and other grounds. It is important to look at the alternatives from above and ask how the alternative non-nuclear strategies — more defensive or more offensive — are related to the political aims you might pursue.

You should go for defensive strategies if your aims are peaceful, but what are peaceful aims? The first meaning is that you do not seek to acquire territory. Non-offensive defence fits well with that aim. But suppose that while you do not wish to acquire territory from your neighbour, you nevertheless wish to keep up a confrontation with him in order to put economic pressure on him or cause him to squander his technological resources in the development of weapons, or in order to arouse your own people. Then clearly you will have to go for offensive forces. It is only if your intentions are wholly peaceful — not only do you not want his territory but you also wish to avoid an arms race in order to avoid putting pressure on his economy — that you will go for the posture of non-offensive defence. In other words, the adoption of non-offensive defence in place of a more offensively-orientated strategy fits a broad change in political aims in which reassurance and more cooperative relations are sought, in place of military and economic confrontation.

### CONCLUSION

Mr. Gorbachev has signalled that he seeks the adoption of non-offensive defence. That this is his aim was made clear in a reply that he sent to a letter from a group of four western analysts, including the author, in which he stated that the Soviet Union seeks “reasonable sufficiency” of armed forces and armaments and went on to say that:

The path towards the realization of reasonable sufficiency we see in governments not having more military strength and armaments than is necessary for their reliable defense, and also in their armed forces being structured in such a way that they will