

very different in appearance from conventional munitions, except on close inspection. Also, chemical weapons production facilities are not easily distinguished from peaceful chemical production facilities.

There is already widespread recognition in this Conference that national technical means of verification will not be sufficient to assure confidence in compliance with a chemical weapons ban. This task will require, therefore, a more intrusive means of verification, in particular, on-site measures. The United States has not sought and is not seeking absolute verification. But the United States is seeking those measures that will provide the necessary confidence that the chemical weapons ban is being complied with.

In his speech before this body on 18 April of this year, the Vice-President of the United States, the Honourable George Bush, cited four points with regard to which parties to a convention must be assured that the relevant provisions of the convention are being complied with. Let me cite these four points again: first, that all declared chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed; second, that all declared chemical weapons have been destroyed; third, that the declared chemical weapons indeed constitute all of the chemical weapons of a party; and fourth, that the declared chemical weapons production facilities are all such facilities possessed by a party. The verification requirements regarding these four points can be described within two broad categories. First, the declared chemical weapons and production facilities — that is, the chemical weapons and production facilities whose existence and location have been declared by a party pursuant to the applicable provisions of the convention — will be subject to systematic international on-site verification. Second, for assurance that undeclared chemical weapons or chemical weapons production facilities do not exist, or that prohibited activities are not occurring, States must rely largely on challenge verification procedures. Today, my statement will focus primarily on the regime of systematic international on-site verification that would be established by the draft convention.

Pursuant to the provisions of the United States draft, chemical weapons would be subject to systematic international on-site verification from the moment they were declared to the moment they were destroyed. A party's declaration would be subject to an initial on-site inspection to confirm the accuracy of the declarations. Then the chemical weapons would be subject to continuous monitoring by on-site instruments and periodic on-site inspections to ensure that they are not removed from their declared locations except to be moved to a declared destruction facility.

At this time I would like to introduce a United States Working Paper on the declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles, which my delegation is tabling today. This Working Paper contains a detailed outline of one possible approach for declaring chemical weapons and for monitoring them until they are destroyed, based on the approach contained in the United States draft convention. The Working Paper focuses on types of on-site monitoring devices that could be utilized for this purpose. We hope this Working Paper will stimulate discussion on this important issue in a way that will aid in resolving it as soon as possible.

Because of the danger of diversion and other forms of evasion during the destruction process, the United States has proposed that the actual destruction of chemical weapons be monitored continuously not only by means of on-site instruments but also by the continuous presence of inspectors. Inspectors would always be on hand during destruction operations to monitor the destruction process itself and to ensure that the monitoring instruments were functioning properly. Thus, under the draft convention, chemical weapons would be closely monitored until they ceased to exist.

The types of procedures the United States believes are necessary for the destruction of chemical weapons were described in Working Paper CD/387, tabled by my delegation on 6 July 1983. These procedures were demonstrated during the Workshop which was held at Tooele army depot in Utah in November 1983. The briefings presented to the