

those of the Canadian Government. The second set of papers we have to distribute is a three volume compendium on Chemical Weapons covering our 1988 Session. The volumes cover (a) Plenary statements (PV), (b) Plenary Working Papers (WP) and (c) Ad Hoc Committee Papers (CD/CW/WP). I would draw to your attention that several Ad Hoc Committee Papers which were tabled after the close of the 1988 formal session in September 1988 are not included in the third volume. We hope to receive these volumes from Canada any day now and will distribute them to you soon afterwards.

This leads me, Mr. President, to the more substantive remarks on our work on Chemical Weapons with which I would like to conclude this statement. Essentially, they comprise a reiteration of some of our long-standing concerns about difficult aspects of our work that, nevertheless, must be resolved if ever we are to succeed. As I have already stated, probably the single most important task before us, without which we can never hope to find broad support for any convention, is to establish an agreed and effective verification framework. In the words of the Paris Conference Final Declaration, the convention must be 'global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable.' In our view, to be effective, the verification regime must be practical. It must use resources efficiently and at tolerable cost. In this context, you may recall that on March 31st last year Canada circulated CD/823, a working paper which examined factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements. We are at present working on a follow-up paper, examining the cost implications of establishing an inspectorate, which we hope to be able to provide to you later this year. Again, our purpose is to advance the process of discussing this crucial aspect of our work on verification in the Chemical Weapons Convention context.


If we are to make further progress, it will be important for us to come to grips with those important problems which still lie ahead that have a political as well as technical dimension. One is Challenge Inspections: here, notwithstanding what

appears to be a general acceptance, at least in principle, of this concept, a number of states still seem to have difficulties in accepting the degree of intrusion which will be needed to make challenge inspection an effective verification measure. Another thorny issue is that of the composition of and the powers to be assigned to the proposed Executive Council. Here we will have to reach agreement among a number of hard choices about the degree of authority this organ will require in order to supervise implementation of the Convention and how to hold it accountable for its actions. How to select its members has also still to be settled. There remain still other problems. Articles X and XI are particularly sensitive, but solutions that fully respect the concerns of the various participants in the negotiations on them ought to be available. It will be a matter of making the necessary choices, keeping in mind that our overall objective is an effective convention. On undiminished security during the transition period, the problem is different: we do not yet have sufficiently clear ideas of what the concerns of some among us about this matter really are. But, if we can resolve related outstanding issues respecting the principles and order of destruction, surely some of those concerns will be

alleviated. Another different but still difficult issue is that of confidentiality. It is of special interest for countries with highly developed chemical industries operating in a highly competitive international environment, and whose legitimate commercial concerns must be taken into account.

There are other aspects of our work on a Chemical Weapons Convention which can best be dealt with by experts. Perhaps the most important issues in this sense relate to definitions and criteria under Article II and to the content and number of the schedules to be required under Article VI. Among those inputs required from legal experts there are two of particular concern to Canada. One is the need for us to consider the meaning of the phrase 'jurisdiction and control,' a phrase that gives rise to issues of extra-territoriality. Canada would prefer that this phrase be deleted from the text and that more specific wording could be found to describe a signatory's obligations. Another relates to Article XII, where for now I will merely recall the Canadian suggestion, made last August, that this separate article may not in fact be required.

Another important point I wish to register relates to suggestions which have been made, here and at the Paris Con-



*The Conference on Disarmament meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the European office of the United Nations. Before the Second World War, the Palais des Nations was the headquarters of the League of Nations and the scene of a number of historic events.*

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