prevail. But a moment's reflection is required to make it clear that the complete success of the Association in question in Canada,—implying, as of course it would, the exclusion from office, not only of the present leaders of both political parties in the Dominion, but of a number of the subordinate and not always least honourable and efficient members of the Federal Parliament, and of each of the Provincial Legislatures, and thus inflicting a cruel injustice and wrong upon perhaps one-third of the people of Canada, —would mean either civil war or the upbreak of the Confederation, and probably both.

But if the purpose of the organization, as avowed, is wrong and reprehensible, still more so are some of the methods adopted by its organs for furthering that purpose. The Society seems to have had its origin in the United States, where it may take its place as a worthy successor of the "Know-Nothing" Association of a former period. It is not long since its organ on that side of the line published what has been well characterized as a most ridiculous "outrage on truth, honesty and common sense," in the shape of a bogus encyclical attributed to Pope Leo XIII, excommunicating the people of the United States in a body, and declaring that on or about the 5th of September, 1893, when the Catholic Congress shall meet in Chicago, it will be the duty of the faithful to exterminate all the heretics found in the jurisdiction of the United States of America. However one may be disposed to laugh at so silly and despicable a forgery, and to imagine that only the most ignorant and uninfluential could be caught by such methods, the fact remains that the canard has caused, and is no doubt still causing, not a little perturbation amongst an honest and well-meaning class of citizens, whose traditional horror of the Roman Catholics is such as to predispose them to believe them capable of almost any atrocity, if only the mandate came from Rome. It is within our knowledge that persons of this class have actually sent the sheet containing the lying absurdity to the press, requesting that it be published to warn and arouse the unwary. Aside from the wickedness of such unprincipled attempts to create bad blood between Catholic and Protestant citizens, whose duty and interest it is to live together in peace and good-will, the most regrettable feature of the case is that, while there is some reason to fear that the rest of the people of Canada may at no distant day be called on to defend the rights of the younger provinces to full self-government in local affairs, against the inadmissible claims of the Hierarchy and a large section of the people of Quebec, a body of Protestants should do what is in their power to compromise the just cause of "Provincial rights" by taking up a position and advocating a policy which would put the Protestants more completely in the wrong than the Catholics who are disputing Manitoba's right to manage her own educational affairs now are. Surely if there is any one principle on which all lovers of freedom and good government should be agreed, it is that no man shall be civilly proscribed or punished for his religious opinions.

THE BEHRING SEA ARBITRATION.

Notwithstanding the energy with which the opposing counsel have so far urged their respective pleas before the Behring Sea Arbitrators, it is noteworthy that they have not as yet joined issue in their arguments. That is to say, Sir Charles Russell's speech is not a reply to the arguments advanced by the two American counsel who have addressed the Board at such length. He is proceeding along an entirely different line. The treaty agreeing to and authorizing the Arbitration specifies three questions to be settled, viz., the jurisdictional rights of the United States in Behring Sea, the preservation of the fur-bearing seals, and the rights of subjects of either nation in regard to the taking of such seals. Provision is made in subsequent sections for a decision by the Arbitrators upon each of five distinct points, four of which concern the nature and extent of the jurisdiction asserted and exercised by Russia in Behring Sea before the cession of Alaska, whether and to what extent Great Britain recognized those rights, and how far those rights passed to the United States under the treaty of cession. All these points regard "rights," while the seventh article provides that in the event of the failure of the United States to establish exclusive rights in Behring Sea, the Arbitrators shall say what regulations may be necessary for the preservation of the seals.

It appears, therefore, that all, or almost all the important points for decision by the tribunal, except those contained in the seventh article, which comes under consideration only in case of failure of the United States to establish exclusive rights, are questions of international law. But though, as the New York Nation admits, "all the departments of the Government—executive, legislative and judicial—seem to have asserted territorial jurisdiction over the eastern portion of Behring Sea," and although, as the British "case" maintains, these claims were at first asserted as descended from Russia, then based on the Republic's own right of dominion, first as over territorial waters, then as entitled to jurisdiction on the high seas over the fur-seal herd which has its home on the Pribyloff Islands, yet Messrs. Carter and Coudert, the counsel for the United States, in their lengthy arguments before the Arbitrators, scarcely touched upon the question of international rights or international law. They based their pleas upon the later grounds taken in the American "case," in which the right of protection and of property in the seals is put on (1) the principles of the common law, (2) the civil law, (3) the practice of nations, (4) natural history, and (5) the common interests of mankind. "To all this shadowy claim," says the printed British argument, "the Government of the Queen submit but one answer—the law." To this point Sir Charles Russell ineffectually sought to have the argument, in the first instance, confined by the Arbitrators. To this, ignoring the subject-matter of the pleas of the opposing counsel, his argument, or so much of it as has been made up to date, seems to have been strictly confined. It seems, then, as if the main question would turn upon the principle which the Arbitrators may lay down as the basis of their decision of the question of "rights." If, as Sir Charles Russell contends, that basis can be nothing other than the admitted principles of international law, the British and Canadian case is as good as won. If, on the other hand, the "shadowy" claims are regarded as entitled to weight, the decision cannot so easily be foreseen though the practical consequences which would inevitably follow from admitting those claims are such as can scarcely fail to give pause to the distinguished statesmen and jurists composing the Board of Arbitration.

There is some obscurity in the press report of the conclusion said to have been reached by the Arbitrators on the point raised by Sir Charles Russell during Mr. Carter's argument, that the American counsel should argue the question of rights apart from the question of regulations. The statement is that after animated discussion "it was finally decided that the counsel for Great Britain should argue the question of rights and the question of regulations separately, but that the tribunal would not give separate decisions." Seeing that, according to the terms of the treaty, the question of regulations can arise only as a consequent of a certain decision in regard to the question of rights, there surely must be some mistake or misapprehension in the wording of this despatch. Be that as it may, it is evident from the tenor of Sir Charles Russell's argument that the British counsel adhere steadfastly to their determination not to be drawn into any discussion of the question of regulations, or of the "shadowy" claims which formed the groundwork of the arguments of the American counsel, until the prior question of international rights or law shall have been decided. The Nation well puts the situation as follows: The English and Canadians say to the Americans in effect:

"So long as you claim to impose 'regulations' on pelagic sealing based on legal rights, we resist, but when you shall have abandoned all your pretensions of *rights*, and come down to the lower and more practical plane of common sense and common benefit to every country, to the pelagic sealer and the Pribyloff Islands sealer, then England and Canada will cordially co-operate in measures to be formulated by the tribunal to preserve the fur-seals in the sea and on all the islands."