

justification as does anthropomorphism in the teachings of modern science. There is no proof, *but all the proof the case admits of is opposed to the view* that a motion or collision of material atoms is ever transformed into feeling or thought. Feeling and thought are subjective phenomena; motions and collisions of matter are objective. That two or more *insentient atoms*, by moving and changing space-relations to one another, should give rise to the consciousness of 'I,' or to a feeling of pleasure or pain, is a fancy as wild as any of the fancies of the old mythologists."

This last statement appears to me to be a gigantic *petitio*. I take it, that consciousness, feeling, thought—all that distinguishes men and animals from "blocks of wood and stone"—are undoubtedly the result of evolutionary processes in the materials of which they are composed, and depend upon the qualities and conditions of the organisms which manifest them; and if these things be so, then I contend that *all the proof the case admits of* is in favor of the view that thoughts and feelings are produced by and are the necessary outcome of changes in the materials of those organisms. No further proof of this proposition is needed than can be found in the common experiences of a hospital ward. A knock on the head deprives a man of consciousness, often for many days. And if this "collision of insentient atoms" be objected to, as showing only how consciousness may be destroyed, then we may instance the fact that a proper supply of oxygenated blood is one essential factor in the production of psychic phenomena. As Professor Dolbear says, in his "Matter, Ether, and Motion:—"

"There is such a formal agreement as well as actual connection between conscious life and the life of the brain, that it is not to be supposed any one who has properly attended to the facts will venture to deny them. Argue as one will, it is true there is no experimental knowledge that is a part of science, of consciousness separable from a material structure called brain, in which physiological changes take place as the conditions for thinking as well as for acting. This is the only known relation of mind and body. However this association of such apparently different provinces is to be explained, it is still true that for every phenomenon in consciousness there is a corresponding phenomenon in matter. Psychologists have pointed out that the phenomena indicate an identity at bottom between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity. To follow this out into particulars would be interesting and perhaps profitable to most; but the significance of it here is that, even in the psychological field where the opportunities for investigation are right at hand and most known, there is no evidence for consciousness apart from a material structure, or that the law of conservation of energy does not hold as strictly true here as elsewhere in physics. So there is no experimental reason for assuming the existence of incorporeal intelligences. There is no psychological question that is not at the same time a physiological question."

It is clear that we neither know nor can conceive of any phenomena that have not a physical basis, and the use of the word phenomena seems itself to presuppose such a basis. I therefore look upon the argument as stultifying. It