

Whitaker (*The Canadian Forum*, November 1986), and no doubt others. There is no need to retrace their steps and repeat their themes. Barros had the advantage of Bowen's work and both agree on the basic biographical facts. Bowen made more of an attempt to write a biography, a balanced treatment of all phases of Herbert Norman's life and career, but was haunted by the central issue of innocence or treason. As a biography it is impressive if not authoritative; in addressing the central question he is generous, understanding to a fault, even perhaps somewhat naive. Barros could not write a biography; he lacks the fundamental ingredients — a degree of sympathy with his subject, an open mind, and the willingness to read the extant documents of the person's career and service. He has written an indictment, a dossier of guilt, a scenario of suspicion, and ends by calling for an official inquiry. Norman, in his view, was a communist, a liar, and, in all probability, a spy, an informal agent and a conduit of damaging misinformation. It was a short, logical and indeed necessary step, however desperate, for Barros also to incriminate Lester Pearson and other colleagues in the Department of External Affairs. Indeed, such is the indictment that one may begin to conclude that Pearson, the DEA and a "Liberal Establishment" are the issue, and that Herbert Norman is merely an incident, an exemplar of deeper things. The difference, in a word, between Bowen and Barros on Norman is that the former sees the path of Christianity, progressivism and then communism leading to disavowal, to a return to the political mainstream and loyal public service, while Barros sees a track from those intellectual roots to espionage and treason.

Scholarship

Barros claims on at least two occasions to be guided by the canons of scholarship, and Granatstein came to the conclusion that Barros had written a scholarly book. This judgment can only be reached, in my view, if one thinks that a scholar is a bloodhound, hot on the trail of a quarry, and that scholarship consists of relentlessly sniffing out data. That is an essential part of scholarship, quarrying the archives, squeezing them till the pips squeak, and made all the more necessary given the data-gathering problems noted above, but that is only part of it. A scholar must distinguish between types of evidence in discriminating fashion and not regard sources as equal, gauge their quality, be careful about what data is elevated to the level of evidence, attempt to corroborate, be cautious if one cannot be authoritative let alone definitive, be concerned where the mind comes to rest and where the search for data ends, weigh competitive interpretations carefully, judge soberly and judiciously, and ensure that the evidence marshaled can bear the weight of the conclusions placed upon it.

By these tests of scholarship, Barros fails. It has not always been so; he has written effectively enough on other subjects. But here, in a poorly organized, repetitive, and contrived argument his prose betrays him. His repertoire of revealing phrases includes "it can be suggested that," "it would not be unfair to say that," "it can safely be said that," "it is also safe to assume that," "it would be fair to assume that," "it can now be said with reasonable certainty," "it is not outside the realm of possibility that," "it would not be unfair to suggest that," "it can be inferred that," "it takes no vivid imagination," "nor would it be unreasonable to speculate that," "it can well be imagined that," and so on, *ad nauseam*, from evidence that is circumstantial or worse; this example from page 139:

...how did Blunt know that Norman was a member of the Russian intelligence operation? The answer is reasonably simple: Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt were lovers, and Burgess, as we have seen, knew Norman. Doubtlessly, "pillow talk" is not the monopoly of heterosexual relationships.

Barros resorts to scenario-building, grasps at rumor and speculation, and gives credence to dubious testimony. Norman is not to be given the benefit of any doubt. When he consorts with leftists it is because he is one of them; when he shuns them it is because he is one of them. When he seeks a position in the Department of External Affairs it is for purposes of subversion; he is a mole burrowing into government. Barros has not read the records of Norman's tenure of the Cairo Embassy from 1956-57, which spanned the Suez Crisis, but "There is, however, one oddity that cannot go unrecorded" (p. 120), on the severing of diplomatic relations with Egypt. Australia asked Canada to act for her in Cairo, but Britain turned to the Swiss. Why? "One plausible, but speculative answer, is that MI5, sensitized to Norman, may have warned the Foreign Office. The Australians, lacking similar intelligence information, picked the Canadians." There is no evidence for this mischievous speculation in the British files; a senior and centrally placed official of the Foreign Office at the time, Sir Harold Beeley, dismissed the idea as ludicrous; and a perfectly sound explanation can be found in the abject state of Anglo-Canadian relations over the Suez affair. Similarly, Barros has not read the records of Norman's service to General MacArthur and to Canada in Japan between 1945 and 1950. But he devotes considerable attention to the suspicions and accusations of General Charles Willoughby, "Charles the Terrible," MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, while utterly ignoring the remarkably frank, supportive, mutually respectful relationship that existed and developed between MacArthur and Norman, itself a tribute to Norman's patience as listener. In sum, Barros's methods would be deplorable on the most innocent of subjects; they are thoroughly contemptible as a means to prove treachery. The fact is that Barros cannot either demonstrate or explain Norman's supposed path from dissent to treason. He cannot identify a single act of treachery. None of the conventional ways by which spies are unmasked — confessions under interrogation, fingered by a defector, "shopped" (turned in) by an accomplice, identified by a fellow-agent, caught in the act — applies to Norman. And suicide is not enough.

Always new information

It is too early to propose exorcising the phrase Cold War from the political vocabulary, as we have isolationism, but, as the archives slowly, annually disgorge the post-1945 period, problems continue to emerge with it as a governing concept. When did the Cold War begin, in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa and Latin America? When did France see "the Russian problem" taking precedence over "the German problem?" When did Australia see "the Russian problem" ousting "the Japan problem?" And why could Presidents harbor possibilities of Soviet-American cooperation in the Middle East as late as 1955, and even 1956? Zealots among American civilian and military leaders may, with regard to East Asia, have seen things clearly, but that did not help them understand different viewpoints, for example, on the future course for Korea, as well as for Japan. And dissent they all too easily saw as subversion. On February 27, 1948, General John Hodge, the Commander of United States forces in Korea, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff