

both. The resource-rich "sub-imperial" states include Algeria and Nigeria (and Zimbabwe and South Africa); states that serve as regional centres for corporations and communications include Egypt, Kenya, Ivory Coast and Senegal. Other potential sub-imperial states include Angola, the Sudan, Zaire and Zambia.

International and internal inequalities, as we have noted, tend to be related, and most sub-imperial states, in particular, are characterized by growing internal stratification. This is especially true of those countries that have adopted a more outward-looking, capitalist style of development strategy. Their brand of nationalism generally eschews socialism but insists on greater local participation in corporate activities by the new *élite*. Capital-intensive manufacturing, growing service-sectors, access to "Euro-dollar" credits, and growing "agribusiness" activities are signs of such an orientation.

So far, sub-imperial, or "go-between", states have largely exerted a regional dominance over economic issues and within the essentially "Western" world order. In the future, however, sub-imperial countries may become influential in the ideological or strategic spheres (for example, a grouping of socialist states in Central Africa or Nigerian military supremacy in West Africa) and sub-imperialism may occur within the socialist world as well (for example, Algeria and Angola might be candidates) despite Soviet dilemmas in northeast Africa.

In any event, the widening of external and internal inequalities in Africa has profound implications for the future of the continent. They make the adoption of a consensual foreign policy or a collective continental ideology less likely. They retard both regional and continental unity. And they make the achievement of collective self-reliance and autonomy problematic, with profound implications for the peoples of Africa. As Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania has recently noted, in something of an understatement: "The present economic order governing international production,

development and exchange does not in practice ensure progress towards meeting those basic human needs for all people, all over the world."

Unless internal changes reduce domestic stratification or external changes result in a "New International (Economic) Order", the prospects for peace and development in Africa are not particularly promising. The revival of tacit and ideological coalitions and the appearance of sub-imperialism, in economic and potentially strategic issues, along with the variety of development strategies, all make the quest for unity and development elusive. And without integration and equality international and internal conflict is likely to continue.

Africa's division into Third and Fourth World states and the harshness of *Realpolitik* in the late 1970s have further exposed the pretence of Pan-Africanism. "Decolonization", along with recent changes in the global economy, has had an ambivalent impact on the continent, producing greater inequality and conflict. The achievement of a *Pax Africana* characterized by development and unity appears to be as elusive as ever despite good intentions and grand dreams.

In conclusion, it is worth while noting the caution of Dr Adedeji of the Economic Commission for Africa about the rather unpromising future for the continent as a whole:

Africa cannot afford to continue to perform in the field of development during the next decade or two at the same rate as it has performed in the last 15 years or so. If it does, the Africa region will be a much poorer relation of the rest of the world than it is now.

He warns, moreover, that, unless there are changes in economic strategy and structure, the ECA estimates "reveal the prospects of even greater disparities in income and levels of development among the countries". "The implications of these are clear and, of course, rather sombre," Dr. Adedeji concludes.