

been largely a defence mechanism on the part of those who were forced to go North against their will. The "British of North America" have long refused to find an identity of their own. Today, English-speaking Canadians are quite detached from Britain, but their latent Americanism has perhaps not altogether disappeared. It is true that the majority of English-speaking Canadians are not descendants of the Loyalists. But have not many of them become so by adoption? Have not many others arrived in Canada because they wished to become Americans?

Today this desire to be Canadians, to act together as a people with an identity separate from that of the United States, is growing stronger. But it is a desire that lacks roots and it is difficult to see how far it can go.

The case of French-Canadians is much simpler. Their culture very early diverged sharply from that of modern France and, though they have always been subject to the American pull, their language and way of life give them a separate identity. Thus they do not react in the same way to the impact of the American economy on Canadian enterprises. According to the document, "they tend not to draw a very sharp distinction between the impact of economic control of local enterprise, whether exercised from the United States or from elsewhere in Canada" (P. 16). Nevertheless, one hopes that French-Canadians will prefer to be a minority in Canada rather than in North America and will be responsive to Canada's efforts to expand the French culture. The situation is perhaps not quite so simple.

Indeed, if it is true that foreign policy must reflect certain aspects of domestic policy, it is the whole problem of Canadian unity, if not that of two cultures (or two nations!), which must be faced when defining Canada-U.S. relations. The document occasionally mentions the need to co-ordinate federal and provincial policies toward the United States. This is not sufficient. Americans themselves have already given us to understand that the uncertainty about Canada's future is not without harmful effects on Canadian foreign policy. Why should we not face up to it? The problem of economic and cultural penetration by the United States must necessarily be considered by Ottawa in conjunction with provincial governments, in particular with the government of Quebec, which, rightly or wrongly, tends to consider Canadian economic nationalism as wholly an Ontario phenomenon.

The Canadian identity cannot be defined without considering the presence in

Canada of two distinct societies, whose sometimes view problems differently. A trait that distinguishes Canada from the United States is perhaps precisely this duality, not to use the discarded expression "biculturalism". In any event, the consolidation of the Canadian economy acquire meaning only if it respects the postulate of a Canadian identity understood in all its complexity.

Means of achieving independence

The Department of External Affairs defines Canadian foreign policy toward the United States as "a comprehensive . . . strategy to . . . strengthen the Canadian economy", thus essentially in economic terms. It is, of course, in this field that the most urgent problems are. Though these problems are well defined in the document, there is less certainty as to how they may be solved. It is understandable that an account of this kind can deal with the formulation of precise policies. Nevertheless, the study is so deficient in its evaluation of the problems that one might have hoped for at least an attempt at solving problems such as the submission of subsidiaries of American companies to essentially American directives on export monopolies and so on. Nor is any mention made of contracts awarded by the Pentagon to Canadian companies. Such contracts, devoid of any protectionist character, are undoubtedly profitable for some factors of the Canadian economy, contributing to technological progress; however, they link Canada uncomfortably to certain American military policies, notably in Vietnam.

Defence policies

With regard to defence policies, we are given to understand in the descriptive part of the document that Canada's strategic dependence on the United States has lessened considerably as a result of technological advances and improved Soviet-American relations. Nothing is said, however, about the renewal of NORAD agreements scheduled for 1973. Nor are we told whether Canadians will be able to make the Americans accept any major diversification of their defence policy, from cold war objectives to peacekeeping goals.

Finally, Canadian independence is not only evident on the economic, cultural and military levels. If it is complete, without, of course, renouncing the need for interdependence, it must affect major policies. Canada has already learned to keep its distance from the United States when required to do so in national interests, as, for example,

Ottawa must deal with U.S. penetration in conjunction with the provinces