

Latin American forum. In these circumstances, there is very little room for manoeuvre, and a period of tranquilization will be necessary before there is any real prospect of progress.

4. Meanwhile, it may be useful to explore other avenues of approach toward an eventual reconciliation. For example, the renewal of commercial relations even on a relatively small and strictly-defined scale might serve as a first step. Cuba would welcome any initiative that would enable it to acquire urgently-needed non-strategic commodities in the United States, and in the latter country there are commercial interests that would undoubtedly like to regain an opening in the Cuban market. Possibly some mutually satisfactory agreement could be negotiated through the auspices of an OAS or a Latin American conference on trade with Cuba. However, this approach would encounter obstacles and objections similar to those envisaged for Mr. Tremblay's tentative suggestions. The United States seems unlikely to accept any arrangements which would assist Cuba to obtain its objective of improving living standards and thus setting an example to other Latin American countries of the advantages of a proletarian dictatorship.

5. In the final analysis we wonder whether the Castro régime, which thrives on hate and anti-Americanism, could afford the luxury of an accommodation of any kind with the United States. We wonder whether the United States could accommodate a government which is such an affront to United States interests and influence. And we wonder whether Canada will not have to learn to live with acute tension in the Caribbean.

843.

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L'ambassadeur au Pérou
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Ambassador in Peru
to Secretary of State for External Affairs

DESPATCH NO. 155

Lima, June 9, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference: Your XL-90 of May 23.

EASING OF TENSION BETWEEN
 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

In your letter under reference you invited comments on a despatch by our colleague in Santiago (No. 165 of May 16) setting forth an interesting approach to the problem of easing tension between the United States and Cuba. In such a matter I yield to his wisdom and judgment; it is also obvious that he has drawn upon his long experience with N.A.T.O.

2. Mr. Tremblay writes on the assumption that it is appropriate and possible for Canada to consider acting as some kind of mediator in the very tense situation that has arisen between these two neighbours. We have had rather confusing newspaper accounts as to whether Canada has made any tentative attempt in this direction and it would be helpful to know from the Department whether indeed any move has ever been made or contemplated.

3. In such matters timing is very important and my first reaction is that we should let a considerable period pass after the disastrous fiasco of the United States-backed attempt at invasion, to let the dust settle both in Washington and in Havana and to permit in particular the United States Administration to pick up the pieces, as has been said, and learn what lessons it can from its unsuccessful indirect intervention. For these purposes the passing of time might be helpful but this assumes that time also runs in our favour in the evolution of the régime in Cuba. Such is probably not the case. I am in no position to give a sound assessment as to the