

The following is an American view of Northern Frontier Defences, from the *Ogdensburg Advance*:

In an article on this subject some few days since, we attempted to show the error into which our Government had fallen, by commencing to fortify at the western end of our Northern frontier; and that the true policy for the protection of our lakes would be to shut out ingress from the sea, by placing fortifications upon the St. Lawrence river, which being accomplished we could safely trust to the overwhelming number and power of our lake marine. In that article we also endeavored to show that the bar in front of our village furnished a very appropriate site for such purpose inasmuch as all vessels would come within short and easy range of its guns. Important, however, as the exterior of this village is for the purpose of mere defence to the property and business of the west, it is entitled to much greater consideration for the advantages it possesses for serving as a base of operations for the invasion of Canada whenever that exigency becomes a necessity. And first as to the facilities it possesses for massing of troops and munitions of war: We have two railroads terminating here—one piercing that great avenue the New York Central, from which branch off in all directions west, and south, other railroads that bring this place within a few hours reach of those extremes of our country. The other leads to that great net work of New England railroads which traverse almost every town and village within her territory. Besides these we have water communication by means of the St. Lawrence, directly with Lake Ontario, and with the exception of a short break between Lake Erie, for which a railroad is substituted, with all the States lying west of us to the waters of the Mississippi. So far then as mere accessibility of convenience for collecting the material of war is concerned, it possesses advantages equal in any degree to those of any other town or village upon our Northern frontier. But these advantages, although great, are not to be compared in importance with those we possess from our being within such short striking distance of the very vitals of Canada. At this place the St. Lawrence is about a mile in width and under cover of the guns from the fort we propose, the troops who accumulated here could easily be transported to the other shore. Once then in siege the terminus of the Ottawa and Prescott

Railroad, leading to the capital of the Canadas and whose depot is immediately on the shore of the river, and a short quarter of a mile back, we tap that great artery of the Canadas, through which their very life-blood flows, the Grand Trunk Railroad. The communication between the two Provinces being cut off by the St. Lawrence River and the Grand Trunk Railroad, but one other, of very little practical importance exists—that by means of the Rideau Canal, at Ottawa, and from thence to Kingston. If this also be desired to be taken we are only within fifty-five miles of Ottawa City—the entrance to the canal from the Ottawa River. The chain of locks at that place once destroyed would require quite a lengthy campaign in which to effect their replacement. This brief statement of facts must show, we think, that Ogdensburg is the key that not only locks out the entrance from the sea, but also unlocks to us the defences of a neighbor who may need ere long some correction for growing misconduct. Her chief power, the protection of England, would be most effectually crippled by lines of communication being cut off, and the whole of the upper provinces would be obliged to bear the burnt of our arms single-handed and alone. The result of such a combat needs no prophet to foretell.

I leave the country to judge if eight hundred thousand pounds expended in small arms would not be more efficient in defending the Canadas than one million three hundred thousand ~~expended~~ expended in fortifications. It is not presumption in me to say I know something of the subject I have been writing upon. I was trained in my youth in the Regular Service to European tactics; I was actively employed the whole of the war of 1812, and when the 104th was reduced to a skeleton, I volunteered to command a gun boat, with a crew of 60 men and two heavy guns. I have no pecuniary object in view; my only aim is the continuation of British connexion. Any patriot editor that will reprint these crude ideas of mine, jumbled together, will confer a favor, and one copy mailed to me, will be full payment for the copyright.