

the Korean war, in terms of Tibet, in terms of the border war with India and in terms of the various crises in the Taiwan Straits.

My second qualification is that the Chinese will sacrifice the logic of their revolutionary communism to the logic of their national self-interest, especially around their borders. In other words, again I am saying that nationalism is more important than communism in their foreign policy as it is practised rather than as it is proclaimed. Examples of this are their friendly relations with the non-communist states around their borders such as Cambodia, Burma and Pakistan, all of which in different ways persecute their own native communist movement and their tolerance of the capitalist and colonial enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao about which Nikita Khrushchev used to taunt them. They would have every reason for regaining these lost territories which were part of China or for making life difficult for the British and Portuguese colonial administrations, and they do make life difficult for the Portuguese. But above all especially, they permit Hong Kong to exist for a very practical reason, and that is that they earn at least 500 million U.S. dollars a year in and through Hong Kong. They earn enough there to pay for all the foreign grain they buy. Hong Kong is of great practical importance to the Chinese.

I think another example of my thesis that they are both restrained and realistic around their borders is their notable restraint over Viet Nam. I feel that the Chinese have been cautious all along over Viet Nam. They have, as they state publicly, no illusions about the cost to them if they were to get involved in the war in Viet Nam. The Americans have said publicly that this is not a Korean situation and that there will be no sanctuary this time. In other words, China would be bombed. The Chinese have acknowledged publicly that they have got the message. I think they genuinely feel that they will not become involved if the Vietnamese will only follow Chinese advice. There are some strong indications that the Vietnamese have not always followed Chinese advice. I think the Chinese genuinely feel the United States will be forced to withdraw from Viet Nam if the communists in that country fight a Maoist type of protracted war, and that China will not necessarily have to become involved.

I think they also genuinely feel that if they do become involved and are bombed, they will still triumph in the end because they feel, rightly or wrongly, that China can never be defeated, because defeat to them involves occupation. This is not necessarily the doctrine the Pentagon would follow in the case of a war with China, but this is the way the Chinese have interpreted it, at least publicly. They say that China can never be conquered. Old Chen Yi, the foreign minister, the tough old marshal, growls in his Szechwanese accent and says he will go back to the mountains of Szechwan and lead the guerillas from there—and he would—and China could not be conquered or occupied.

I think the Chinese will come into the war if they are pushed into a corner, a parallel again with Korea, and if they feel their national self-interest demands it. There is no easy line; nobody knows and everybody has been looking for it. Certainly an American invasion of North Viet Nam would, in my view, more likely than not bring in the Chinese. If the escalation increases short of outright physical invasion on the ground of North Viet Nam—in other words, if there are many more extensive bombing attacks—I just do not know whether the point will be reached where the Chinese will come in. I do say that they have done