To take the case of the Arab-Israel dispute, the Council devoted 33 of its 46 meetings in 1967 to this subject alone, but far more time was spent by the representatives in negotiations outside the Council chamber than was spent inside. Seven resolutions were adopted after the outbreak of fighting on June 4 -- five relating to a cease-fire, one to the welfare of the refugees and one to a political settlement of the dispute. In addition, a consensus was expressed by the President on arrangements for the supervision of the cease-fire. It has been said that the Council was not able to prevent the fighting and this is true, although efforts were made by some member states, including Canada, to have the Council intervene before June 4. On the other hand, not enough attention has been paid, I believe, to the remarkable achievement of the Council in adopting a resolution on November 22, 1967, which outlined certain principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Adoption of this resolution came after several months of negotiation. It was based on the principle of a balance of obligations and responsibilities on both parties to the dispute, and its unanimous adoption lent great weight to its recommendations, even though these were not decisions in the sense of binding commitments under Article 25 of the Charter.

The first Canadian representative on the Security Council, General A.G.L. McNaughton, pointed to some of the principles underlying this kind of multilateral diplomacy in a speech over 18 years ago, before the Council became a casualty of the great-power deadlock which followed the events in Korea that summer:

"First, the Security Council is not in a position to embark on armed intervention.... In consequence, it can usually do little more in the initial stage than to call on the parties engaged in the dispute to stop fighting and to start talking, and to offer them the means by which they can work out a settlement through negotiations rather than by conflict.

"It is, I believe, most important that, when the Council calls upon the parties to cease hostilities, it must make such a call both universal and impartial. The Council should, therefore, make it plain that, in calling upon the parties to end hostilities, it is not prejudging the ultimate political solution which may be achieved through its good offices.

"Thirdly, to the greatest possible extent the responsibility of solving a political problem should be left primarily with the people, who are immediately affected by it.... There is a great advantage in stability through having an agreed rather than an imposed conciliation, and this procedure has the useful effect of strengthening the sense of responsibility at a point where this is essential to a healthy political life."

I have quoted these somewhat lengthy remarks because I think it is significant that the Council is still faced with the same choices in its efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes, although in the interim the United Nations has added the tool of peace-keeping by military forces to its repertoire of peaceful settlement procedures. Its new-found