

disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."...

The Draft treaty on non-proliferation referred to in the non-aligned nations' memorandum is, of course, that which was tabled by the USA delegation on 17 August, 1965. Its principal purpose is to give effect to the recommendation of Resolution 1665 (XVI) and that of Resolution 225 of the UNDC, para 2(c), calling for a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The essence of the USA draft treaty (which is available to the Committee as an attachment to the report of the ENDC A/5986) is contained in the words in Article I. "Each of the nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to ... take any action which would cause an increase in the total number of States or other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons." The wording of Article II imposes a similar obligation on the non-nuclear States Party to the Treaty. On 24 September, 1965, the Foreign Minister of the USSR submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation. The spokesmen of the USA and the USSR have explained the provisions of their respective draft treaties, so I shall confine my remarks in this regard to examining the divergencies between "the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty" which they reveal.

If we compare the respective first articles in the two drafts, which are intended to specify the undertakings of the nuclear powers parties to the treaty, we find the following. The USSR draft is intended not only to prevent any nation emerging as a new independent nuclear power (as the USA draft does) but it also is intended to prevent, as we understand it, any new organization being set up within an alliance or other group of states with the independent power to use nuclear weapons. It further would appear designed to prohibit certain defensive arrangements which now exist within the NATO alliance. Under these existing arrangements certain nuclear weapon delivery vehicles of limited range in the hands of allies of the USA could be used to deliver nuclear weapons in order to repel aggression. The nuclear weapons, however, are kept under the close custody of USA personnel only. Their use would require both a decision by the other government that it wished to use the weapons, and a separate decision by