

and force commanders need to be appointed early, and be associated with the negotiating process that precedes the setting up of the mission, and with the framing of the mandate by the Security Council.

(v) **Headquarters staff**

A competent nucleus staff of military, police and civilian personnel for the headquarters must be available. They must be drawn from existing organizations, where personnel would have worked together for some time, and therefore understand one another, and have a working knowledge of common procedures. This would be feasible if there are some dedicated organizations oriented towards peacekeeping activities, such as regional cells for data collection and monitoring, or regional United Nations training centres in selected locations, or a United Nations Staff College, functioning on a regular basis, thus providing the bank from which to draw on the personnel when required.

(vi) **Division of responsibilities**

An appropriate division of responsibilities between the United Nations and other international actors, must be defined.³ Such division of labor should obviously, take advantage of the different capabilities and interests of regional organizations, national governments, and non-governmental organizations. Current experiences indicate that the United Nations may be most effective in the fields of preventive action, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, mediation, and peace-building activities through its various agencies. In time, regional organizations would need to assume a greater role in assisting the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security; but for the time being, these organizations could play a role in economic development, peacemaking, and confidence building at the regional and sub-regional levels.

(vii) **Availability of UN forces**

Crisis situations require the speedy deployment of military forces. The inordinate delay in the arrival of troops in the mission area was a most frustrating feature of the missions that were set up for the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and to some extent, Somalia; even more inexcusable was the inadequate response for Rwanda. One of the measures that has now been instituted to overcome this inadequacy is the earmarking of "stand by" forces by member states; most commendable and needs to be pursued with vigor. As of today, this arrangement apparently provides for about 100,000 personnel pledged by 74 member states. However, it is a moot point whether such "stand by" forces would, in fact, be available immediately on demand; the Rwandan experience indicates that political expediency and domestic compulsions will always dictate the responses of member states.

It is important to raise and maintain a standing force of a defined composition, properly organized and trained, and adequately equipped, to be available to the United Nations for immediate deployment when authorized to do so by the Security Council. Reservations about costs, and possible biased utilization at the