

Experience in coalitions of the 1990s suggests that the next generation of national defence and security organizations ought to be constructed around the following general notions:

- * Multilateral security and humanitarian operations are often interwoven activities;
- * Many operations – current overseas NATO operations and domestic drug operations – are more or less continuous;
- * Many types of operations involve inseparable aspects of several related problems – military security operations become entangled in the maze of refugees' difficulties involving housing, medical care, feeding, and safety -- all of which flow seamlessly into many other matters and jurisdictions;
- * These types of operations routinely include Canadian Forces units, police forces, governments and departments of governments at various levels; NGOs, international organizations, and, among other things, military, diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, logistical, and intelligence functions;
- * In Canada, no national/federal department or agency has sole responsibility for conducting operations in these circumstances and the traditional departmental division of responsibility for military, foreign policy, police, and domestic and international operations while perhaps just sufficient for generating policy and forces, is incompatible with and inhibits the development of an unified coherent responsibility for coordinating and directing continuous operations.

Reaching these goals and reacting to presently perceived weaknesses may require an internal "machinery of government" response and an external operational response.

The Machinery of Government Aspect

In broad terms, the defence and security establishment must direct and manage four activities related to international security conditions. These activities include continual capability maintenance and force development– that is, keeping what you need in good order and renewing or replacing these capabilities over time. In a defence system, as in Canada, based on "capability planning" rather than commitment planning it is obviously critically important to select and maintain the right capabilities – right in terms of the long-term national strategy.

The second major purpose of the machinery for the higher direction of defence and security is to anticipate needs and events in the near and middle terms with sufficient reliability to allow governments to act in a timely, unhurried way to changing circumstances. Third, officials and officers must be allowed the discretion and have the instruments to change policy declarations into fact. In the context of this essay, this means that they must be entrusted to deploy the right forces to the right place, at the right time, and then to sustain them there.

Finally, every activity must be carefully recorded to facilitate audits, accountability, and Canadians' right to know what is done in their name. Whenever decisions are taken by ad hoc