

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Clearly, steps of this kind should open prospects for the establishment of a list of substances used in civil industry that should be under regular control in the framework of the future Convention. Of course, measures for control of exports of sensitive substances of this nature must necessarily be applied "across the board", and not only with respect to certain destinations, in order to avoid the risk of diversion.

But unilateral measures alone cannot solve the problem. Neither does it appear to us to be possible to conclude a chemical "non-proliferation treaty", for, besides the fact that such an agreement would leave stocks and production facilities intact, it might well increase the imbalances between the States which continued to possess such weapons and the others.

On the other hand, it would probably be wise to begin consultations among the concerned countries, and in particular those having a large chemical industry, with a view to adopting national measures that would make it possible to avoid compounding the difficulties involved in the negotiations on a total ban and on the destruction of stocks by problems concerning proliferation.

Among the many problems which should be examined by our Conference, France considers that priority attention should be given to the following:

- (i) The procedures for verification of civilian factories producing substances which might be diverted for the purpose of manufacturing chemical warfare agents.
- (ii) The elimination of stocks and of production facilities, concerning which last year the French delegation submitted a text that is contained in document CD/630. We have also observed that, in the area of verification, the language of the Soviet proposals of 15 January prompts us to ask for additional information which will, we hope help further the discussion in this area.
- (iii) The composition and modus operandi of the bodies to be set up under the Convention.

But our work is not confined to chemical disarmament, as is clearly indicated by our agenda. Without wishing to review all the items appearing on our agenda, I would like to refer to two other major areas, to which we will certainly devote a significant proportion of our meetings: space and nuclear weapons.