

While the INF Treaty was not as strategically sensitive for Canada as for our allies, other Canadian purposes were well served. Not only were our arms control objectives advanced, but impressive consultation machinery was also established where all allies had a voice. This augurs well for the future. Canada can look back on the process with satisfaction.

Major reductions in strategic offensive arms, however, could have direct implications for Canada. Limitations on ballistic missiles could increase the importance of long-range cruise missiles and the importance of limiting them as well. On the other hand, failure in START could give even greater prominence to the SDI, which in turn would raise questions so far largely avoided by Canada.

#### Recommendations for Canadian Policies

In addition to the continued pursuit of Canada's six objectives for arms control (as outlined by the Prime Minister) there are two broad areas of enquiry in which Canada might usefully engage.

First is the question of the strategic implications for Canada in particular, and for NATO in general, of the United States' moving toward a more defence-reliant nuclear posture. This should be examined regardless of whether the United States sees fit to barter constraints on strategic defences for major reductions in offensive weapons. And it should be examined not only by Canada but also by NATO. Integral to such an examination is the question of whether or not nuclear vulnerability is to continue to be regarded as a desirable, or the least undesirable, condition, and whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union seem likely to continue