

concerned, we refuse to consider these as unrelated objectives, even though priority in time must be given to the first, which is withdrawal. We still refuse to believe that these objectives cannot be achieved without adopting proposals for forms of pressure which would be an admission by the Assembly of complete and final failure to solve this problem constructively. Our delegation does not believe that we should yet admit any such failure.

We think that there is still a way of bringing about withdrawal by spelling out the detailed arrangements which would follow it, and which would strengthen security and prepare the way for pacification. In its resolution 461 of 2 February, the Assembly indicated in general terms the necessity for such arrangements. In our view, we should now, before deciding on other measures, follow up that indication with something more concrete and specific.

We think that both parties should be willing to accept any recommendations to this end which are satisfactory to the great majority of the Members of this Assembly. If Israel refuses to withdraw its forces immediately—not on the implementation—on the adoption of such recommendations by this Assembly, it would be taking on a very heavy responsibility indeed, and would forfeit our support and might provoke consideration of other measures by the Assembly.

The arrangements to follow withdrawal, which we should now agree on, are in essence, though not of course in detail, envisaged in the Secretary-General's reports of 24 January and 11 February, the former of which has already been endorsed by this Assembly. If we could carry these arrangements into effect, it would ensure that such withdrawal would help to bring about conditions which promise greater security and stability, and these arrangements might, I suggest, include the following:

First, there should be a firm pledge by the Governments of Israel and Egypt to observe scrupulously the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. But when we talk about scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement we should mean not some of the provisions, but all of them.

And what are they? First, the establishment of an Armistice Demarcation Line which is not a political or territorial boundary, but which cannot be changed except by agreement between the two parties.

Also the Armistice Agreement prohibits any form of aggressive action, war-like or hostile acts or, if you like, belligerent acts or resort to force by the land, sea or air forces of either side. They establish the right of each side to security and freedom from fear of attack.

They do not prejudice or confirm any political or territorial right or claim or boundary, but they do establish, the Armistice Agreement's provisions, Egypt's administrative control over the Gaza strip without giving it any rights of territorial sovereignty there.

They provide for the deployment in certain areas on both sides of the demarcation line of defensive forces only, and they define what "defensive" means.

Finally, they provide for the total exclusion of Israel and Egyptian armed forces from the El Auja demilitarized zone. That, then, is what we should mean when we talk about scrupulous observance of the Armistice.

The second stage in this programme would be arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force. In this regard, we think that the Secretary-General and the Commander of that Force should make arrangements with the Governments concerned for the deployment of the UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line. This deployment, which should be made effective with the minimum of interference with civilian life and activity, would be for the sole purpose of putting the Force in a position:

- (a) to assume certain duties of the Truce Supervision Organization under the Armistice Agreement between the two States;
- (b) to assist in the prevention of incursions and raids and retaliatory attacks across the Armistice Line in either direction;
- (c) generally to maintain peaceful conditions along both sides of the line.

Thirdly, there is the question of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. In our view it should be agreed and affirmed by us that there should be no interference with innocent passage through or any assertion of belligerent rights in the Straits of Tiran.