

people towards militia methods of defence. The other is that our Atlantic coast is rich in seamen, fishermen, and men who, while nominally belonging to other vocations, none the less are habituated to the sea and at all events are good boat-sailors. On the Atlantic coast those who fall into these several categories probably number about 20,000 men.

If we fix our attention on this plentiful supply of good seamen, if we bear in mind this natural bias, and if we bring to bear on these two conditions the fact that we have in the Royal Navy a reservoir of the best professional skill and discipline in the world, we begin to see light.

It seems clear that we have special facilities for the raising of a naval militia which might attain to an appreciable degree of efficiency. As seamen many of its men would be the finished product at the moment of enlistment, and they could learn quickly enough some of the duties of naval seamen. There is at once a use for a naval militia, and sharp limitations to its use. No one in his senses will suppose that a body of naval militia could board a warship, furnish officers, man her exclusively, and render effective service. A warship needs a nucleus of highly-trained specialists—gunners, torpedo men, artificers, engineers who understand the peculiarities of warship engines, wireless operators, fire-control operators, signalmen, etc.—as well as professional officers. But in addition to these specialists a warship, especially a large vessel, employs a number of men who need not possess special technical training, who may be comparatively unskilled. Such an element could be supplied by a naval militia.

Thus we see that we need: (1) a professional element, every man of which must be a highly-trained specialist; (2) a militia element. And we must look to the militia element to supply the popular foundation of our force. So let us consider the militia element first.

Such a force might render valuable services in two ways. First, a naval war in which the Empire is involved