

written to him on August 18 by the representatives of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, in which they stated their willingness and desire to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan respectively when the United Nations could take effective action to ensure, without regard to any regime or political party, stability and security in those countries.

Therefore the resolution sponsored by Norway, Canada and the five other countries did not, as I have said, expressly refer to withdrawals but implicitly made provision for the withdrawal of those forces by ensuring the mandate of the Secretary-General in the light of the United States and United Kingdom declarations as contained in the letters to which I have referred.

Finally, the seven power draft resolution-the Canada-Norway resolution-invited the Secretary-General to continue his studies with respect to the feasibility of establishing a stand-by United Nations Peace Force. Hon. members will recall that in this House during the earlier discussion on external affairs I expressed the view of the Government in that regard, and we welcomed the insertion of a reference to a stand-by force.

In the seven-power resolution there was also a statement to the effect that careful study would be given to the question of economic development in the countries of the Middle East, and it urged the Arab-countries in explicit terms to study the representations made to them by the Secretary-General, which were endorsed by the President of the United States. It also requested the member states to co-operate fully in the carrying out of those studies and to assist in implementing the more positive and operative parts of the resolution. Finally, it invited the Secretary-General to report on his activities in trying to establish agreement among the Arab countries, the first of such reports being required to be made to the General Assembly by not later than September 30, 1958.

While the seven-power draft does conform to the principles and does meet the main objectives which had governed the Canadian approach, we were at the same time conscious of the shortcomings of that resolution. I endeavoured to make it clear, on behalf not only of Canada but of the other co-sponsors, in my statement in support of the resolution on August 19, 1958 that we were open to constructive suggestions with respect to its improvement. I stated particularly and at once that if it were to serve to secure great power and regional support we immediately conceded that the resolution could not be considered by any country or group of countries as perfect. In the atmosphere which prevailed on Tuesday of this week however, this resolution undoubtedly offered the only common denominator which would warrant broad support as a formula for the reconciliation of conflicting interests.