

increasingly well supported; those in East Africa and Latin/Central America less so (although, if it is fully subscribed, the new multi-donor trust fund for the Great Lakes of Africa may move this region into the 'adequately resourced' category). Support for institution and capacity building are particularly pressing needs in these two under-resourced regions.

Generally speaking, to date, weapons collection/destruction and DDR seem to have been among the better resourced types of SALW activity. Among those types of functional programming not particularly well supported are security sector reform and capacity building (although this may be changing). Simply put, in many parts of the world there is a largely unmet need for capacity-building measures to close the gap between formal multilateral commitments and the domestic capacity to implement these agreement. There is a similar need in many regions to provide security forces with appropriate training in both the techniques of community policing and the secure storage, safe handling and responsible use of SALWs. Expert opinion is that these types of programming (at the intersection of arms control, law enforcement, development, peacebuilding and human security) are precisely those with the greatest potential to reduce demand and mitigate the (mis)use of SALWs. Many experts argue that significant payoffs might result from even relatively modest increases in resource allocations to these types of programmes.

Regional partnerships and collaboration/cooperation within and between regions are emerging as important features of the SALW landscape. Partnerships between states, multilateral institutions and NGOs are also increasingly important.

Another trend that seems to be emerging is that the discursive and institutional distinctions between arms control, law enforcement, development, peacebuilding and human security seem to be becoming increasingly blurred when it comes to dealing with SALWs. More and more, the SALW problem has come to be seen as multidimensional in nature, with 'root causes' that are closely bound up with economic, political and institutional underdevelopment. As a result, the development community is increasingly interested in tackling the SALW problem and ODA resources are becoming an increasingly important element of the funding for SALW-related programming.

Certain states are willing and able to devote considerable resources to the SALW problem. In this connection the UK, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Germany continue to exercise an important leadership role. Canada also plays a significant leadership role, although it devotes considerably less financial support to SALW programming than do the 'first-tier' donor states. It is worth noting that these are not the only states supporting SALW programmes. In fact, in recent years the donor field has grown increasingly crowded, with the perhaps inevitable result that resource allocation has become increasingly inchoate. This suggests that we may be approaching the point at which the greater coordination of state spending will become necessary.

State spending is typically diffuse and "across-the-board". There is also little effective coordination between states and the growing danger of wasteful duplication and overlap in SALW programme funding. This may be improving as networks of officials from states, multilateral institutions and NGO mature and deepen. Concerted action to enhance coordination could have significant payoffs in terms of rationalizing and maximizing the impact of SALW-related resource allocations.

### **Options for Canada**

Given all this, how can the government of Canada channel Canadian SALW assistance more "effectively" – that is, in ways that meet real and pressing operational needs, minimize duplication and overlap, enhance coordination, and are highly visible and accessible? In ideal-typical terms, three basic options can be identified: