

Related to this (but not confined to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction) would be supply-side agreements not to introduce more advanced versions of existing weapons systems into regional conflicts. Such measures have already been attempted, both in President Carter's ill-fated Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CATT) and in the 1991 guidelines of the P-5.⁴⁵ Possible systems that could be included in control discussions among major suppliers would be: advanced main battle tanks, enhanced explosive munitions, precision-guided battlefield weapons, short-range missile systems, cruise missiles, and advanced electronic warfare systems. Few of these systems have been widely diffused, yet all pose potential proliferation threats. Again, the thrust of such measures would be *preemptive* and forward-looking, and designed to limit the diffusion of weapons (and improvements to existing platforms) that emerge out of the military-technological revolution.

The second set of supply-side measures would concentrate on reinforcing systems to coordinate national export controls, focusing in particular on military-use technologies, such as those contained in CoCom's International Munitions List (IML). The rationale for technology export controls in the post-Cold War period has shifted from containment to non-proliferation, and this has had an important impact on existing technology control regimes.⁴⁶ The most dramatic change has been the demise of the CoCom (which formally ceased to exist on 31 March 1994), and its replacement by an as-yet vague organization with a wider membership and different mandate. In particular, attention has shifted to focus on a narrower list of technologies, and on a specific (if not public) list of proscribed countries who are threshold or opaque proliferators of particular weapons systems (states such as North Korea, Iraq, India, Pakistan and Iran are often mentioned). The membership criteria will include implementation of an effective export control system and adherence to the various control lists, and to relevant arms control treaties (such as the NPT or CWC).⁴⁷ The consultative mechanism will almost certainly be weaker than that of CoCom, and harmonization of the legal and

⁴⁵ The P-5 guidelines agreed not to "introduce destabilizing military capabilities in a region," which is not quite the same as an agreement to control new technologies. On President Carter's guidelines, see *Review of the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).

⁴⁶ Bertsch and Cupitt, 53-70; National Academy of Sciences, *Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment* (Washington: National Academy Press, 1991); Kenneth Boutin, *Verifying Controls on Technology Proliferation*, Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (July 1992); Allen Chong, "Verification of End-Use Commitments: An Examination of US and Canadian Approaches," paper presented to the 11th annual conference of the Verification Research Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Montebello, 3-5 March 1994.

⁴⁷ For details see Thomas Jones, "Successor to CoCom: Issues, Opportunities and Challenges for Non-Proliferation Export Controls," paper presented to the Canadian counter-proliferation verification workshop, Ottawa, 25 November 1993.