

Europe. The CFE negotiations have played an important function in legitimizing (and eventually verifying) the asymmetrical reduction of the Soviet preponderance of force in Europe.

But, given the recent events in Eastern Europe, the likely completion of a CFE agreement, the trend towards unilateral action by the Soviet Union, and similar budgetary (and demographic) pressures in the West, one must wonder about the future of conventional arms control negotiations in Europe. These factors, and the increasing complexity of conventional arms control, may signal an end to the relevancy, feasibility, or desirability of further negotiated reductions in Europe. The exception to this may be the requirement to negotiate, or institutionalize in some form or another, the deep reduction of both German and foreign troops in a reunited Germany.

Finally, there is one last paradox contained in Gorbachev's compromises based on principle. Until now, Gorbachev has carried out a policy of arms reduction in which a lessened military potential has ironically proven to be a source of increased international influence, and perhaps even power. As one Soviet proponent of the concept of reasonable sufficiency stated, "the ability of a state to limit its military potential and take account of the partner's interests in its policy can, paradoxically, become a factor of power today."¹¹² Whether this will continue to be the case in the face of the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe remains the challenge for Soviet arms reduction policies in the immediately foreseeable future.

¹¹² Igor Malashenko, "New rules of international behaviour", *New Times*, 17-23 October 1989, (42), p. 18.