

fore highly desirable that the phase-out period is kept as short as possible. A threshold system without a zero cut-off point within a limited time-span as the end-product would be of little or no help in advancing the task of blocking vertical and horizontal proliferation as set out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the contrary, new threshold arrangements would rather be counter-productive as regards efforts to strengthen the NPT. Next year the third Review Conference of the NPT will take place. As Parties to this Treaty, an overwhelming number of States, including Sweden, have renounced their nuclear-weapon option. Under the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to negotiate limitations on their nuclear-weapon development. It is of fundamental importance that the Parties to this Treaty honour their undertakings. Proposals for threshold arrangements must be looked upon in this perspective. Furthermore such arrangements would complicate efforts to establish a test-ban moratorium or a nuclear freeze, supported by many States.

We will study with great interest further information from the delegation of Japan with regard to the possible upgrading of the international verification system.

Sweden for its part considers that verification of nuclear-weapon tests is feasible down to such very low yields that the whole spectrum of nuclear-weapon development for all practical purposes would be covered. Certainly, as has been outlined, adequate verification measures would probably require some further refinement and testing, but that demands no other scientific and technical resources than those already within reach.

CD/PV.280

pp.16-17

Poland/Turbanski

9.8.84

CW

The reason for my taking the floor today is to introduce, on behalf of a group of socialist States, a working paper, to which Ambassador Issraelyan referred in his statement today, entitled "Organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee of a CW Convention", issued under the symbol CD/532, as well as CD/CW/WP.84, and as you undoubtedly noted, distributed at the beginning of today's plenary meeting.

The paper's main outlines are based on previous proposals of socialist States as well as on proposals of other delegations. It contains also some new elements such as, for example, on co-operation of international and national verification bodies. This subject is covered in Chapter III of the Working Paper.

In our view, closer co-operation between these bodies should contribute to implementation of the Convention.

By introducing this document we would also like to contribute to the further development of the concept of the organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee.

The basic provisions of the Working Paper are contained in three chapters concerning: General provisions and structure; functions; and co-operation with the national verification bodies of the State Parties.

I should like to stress that we are ready to co-operate and to work together with all other delegations in the search for mutually acceptable solutions for the work of the Consultative Committee.

Again in this respect the socialist States are ready to demonstrate their flexibility, willingness to compromise as well as understanding of other delegations' positions, and we hope that such an approach will be reciprocated.

Our aim is to establish the machinery of the Consultative Committee such as would ensure the best possible co-operation among the States Parties to the future Convention in order to prevent any possibility of its violation. This should be secured by means of consultations, broad exchange of information and effective co-ordination of the work of