

In any case, as I see it, there is no real substance to this legal argument. Leaving aside again Article 10, which itself seems to give the Assembly adequate powers, the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2, reads:

"Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion". By the word "action" is clearly meant the kind of mandatory action which the Security Council is empowered to take under the Chapters of the Charter which define its function. This surely does not include the "recommendations . . . to the state or states concerned" which the Assembly is empowered to make. Nor will these recommendations be made, in any case, until the Security Council has had the opportunity to take the action which it is empowered to take and has failed so to do. There is therefore no suggestion in this draft resolution that the Assembly will be assuming the power to act in the manner prescribed for the Security Council.

So far as the draft resolution itself is concerned, the other sponsoring delegations have reviewed its purposes and its principles, and I do not think it is necessary for me at this stage to go over the same ground again. There will be time for discussion of details later. I should like, however, to say one or two things about it now.

Section A of the draft resolution seems to command almost unanimous approval. Mr. Vishinsky said that his delegation could accept it, but he wished to propose some amendments which we shall no doubt soon have an opportunity to examine. He was, of course, satirical about the 24-hour rule for summoning the Assembly and thought that two weeks would be more reasonable. How could the Soviet Union Foreign Minister, he wondered, get from Azerbaijan to Lake Success in 24 hours. Well, Korea has shown us what an aggressor can do in two weeks by exploiting the initial momentum that an aggressor always has over his victim. Twenty-four hours is therefore not, I think, too short a time. But in any event, a special emergency session of the kind visualized in this draft resolution would not be summoned until the Security Council had itself attempted and failed to deal with the aggression. I have no doubt that the Soviet Union Government, for instance, would be very adequately represented indeed at any such meeting of the Security Council and that its representative would be able to move across the hall from the

Security Council to the Assembly within 24 hours. Probably he would not have to come from Azerbaijan. In any case, what would a Soviet Union Foreign Minister be doing in Azerbaijan at a time of international stress and tension at Lake Success, with a breach of the peace threatening?

The next section of the draft resolution — point B — provides for a peace observation commission. The importance of this has, I think, been demonstrated by events in Korea and in Greece and other places. The U.S.S.R. Delegation apparently approves of this provision — and we certainly welcome that approval — but it warns us that the members of such commission must not be the tools of any one group of states. It is a point well taken, and I hope that all delegations, including the U.S.S.R. will remember it. Members of this commission — and indeed of any United Nations commission — must be men of independent judgment who will not be subjected to inappropriate pressure or, indeed, pressure of any kind, from any other government.

Point C of the draft resolution is one to which my Government attaches very particular importance, especially paragraph 8 . . .

We think that this section, and especially this paragraph, marks an important step forward in putting police power behind the United Nations will for peace; in organizing and making effective steady and collective resistance to aggression. Paragraph 8 is of particular importance for smaller countries which, as the Korean incident has shown, do not normally have land forces available for quick and effective United Nations action in any part of the world. This paragraph, of course, does not establish an international force as such, but it does provide the germ of such a force by making it possible to earmark national contingents for United Nations purposes; national contingents which will be organized and trained to implement United Nations recommendations which they have approved, and which will, of course, be available for other purposes of national defence as well.

Mr. Vishinsky has complained that this recommendation goes too far and is a violation of the Charter. It seems to me a more legitimate criticism might be that it does not go far enough in strengthening the machinery provided for by the Charter; but it is at least a beginning, and a beginning which, we hope, may lead to important and far reaching developments. It is true, of