

that the soul during its past existence learned all things; and this is precisely what is taught in the later passage. For while it is there demonstrated that Meno's attendant had learned geometry, and so obtained an acquaintance with that science (εἶχε καὶ μεμαθηκεῖ) in a former state of being, the remark is added, that the demonstration is applicable, not to a few geometrical propositions merely, but to the whole range of truth (οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας τὰντα ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀπαντῶν).

The expression *τα ἐνθαδὲ*, in the earlier passage, is worthy of notice, as shewing, that, when Plato wrote the *Meno*, he held the opinion that not merely *our apprehensions of eternal and immutable truths*, but also, in part, *our mental representations of absent objects of sense*, are the revival of knowledge which we possessed in a former life. The same thing is apparent from the words *ἀτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενούς οὐσης . . . αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν*. The term *φύσις*, though employed in a wide sense to include what may be termed the universe of abstract truths, cannot be taken as exclusive of the universe of sensible objects; and therefore the import of the sentence is, that, since all things in nature, sensible and supra-sensible, are of kin, the knowledge of any one may reawaken the knowledge which we formerly had (either in this life or in a preceding) of any other. The *Meno* in this respect differs from the *Phaedrus*, where the hypothesis of our possession of knowledge in a former life is advanced solely to account for our apprehensions of eternal and unchangeable truth.

NOTE VI.

‘Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνομοία ὄντα ἕτερω, φησόμεν, ὀνοματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ παντ’ εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα.—(*Philebus*, § 7. Bekker).

From Stallbaum's remarks, quoted by Bekker, it appears that the word *ἕτερω* in this passage has greatly perplexed commentators. The solution of the supposed difficulty, which finds most favour with Stallbaum, is, to take *ἕτερω ὀνοματι* as signifying *improprio nomine*. Should this rendering not be adopted, he would, with Heindorf, change *ἕτερω* into *ἐν γέ τω*. I am not able to see any reason either for altering the text, or for departing from the ordinary meaning of *ἕτερω*. Protarchus has undertaken to defend the position, that pleasure is the *summum bonum*. In opposition to this, Socrates has urged that pleasures are various, some being very unlike others.