

thoroughly instructed in military science. These cannot be performed by the control department, which has no officers trained or qualified for the work.

Consequently, the roads by which the columns of baggage, provisions, and stores are to travel, and the hours at which they are to start, and many other details affecting them, must be arranged by military officers with reference to the movements of the troops; and, even when arranged, they are subject to alteration, owing to occurrence which may happen in time of war. A sudden attack may choke up a road, a bridge may be destroyed at the last moment; a swampy road may become impassible, or a thousand other incidents may occur to cause delay, any of which may render a change of arrangement in the movements of both troops and columns of waggons necessary.

These changes must be made on the spot by military staff officers, and must frequently be made without reference to the general commanding. If a control officer was to attempt to change such arrangements without reference to military authority, he might obstruct the advance of reserves moving to support an attack, or interfere in some other way with the movements of the troops, and cause a serious disaster.

Nor is it in front of an army alone that it is necessary that all movements, whether of troops or of columns of waggons, should be subject to military arrangement, but also in rear.

The task of keeping open and protecting the communications of an army is always a matter of vital importance, and is frequently attended with difficulty and danger, which can only be dealt with by a military officer of experience on the spot; and in such a case it would be impossible to make reference to the general commanding at every step, and wait for his instructions, to be filtered through his controller till they dribbled down to the commissary in charge of the transport. The very idea is simply ludicrous.

These are merely possible incidents taken at random, but similar cases must arise continually on service, whether an army is advancing, retiring, or stationary, and in all cases the arrangements made to meet them must have reference to strategical and tactical considerations.

The object of a campaign is military, and all other considerations must be made subservient to that first consideration. We do not fight the enemy in order that we may be able to feed and clothe our troops in order that they may be able to fight the enemy.

The head of an administrative department of the army cannot be independent of the military staff, nor can he be a staff officer in the same sense as the head of a military department; he must be *departmental*, and dependent on those who have the direction of the strategic and tactical movements of the army, which must necessarily be of the first importance in war.

To suppose that a general officer can give his instructions to the heads of his military and administrative departments, to be carried out independently, as it were, in two parallel lines, and that the military officers, who are frequently forced to use discretionary power according to the operations of the enemy, are never to interfere with the movements of the administrative branches except through the general, is absurd.

Moreover, a civil officer unacquainted with military science would require different and more detailed orders than the head of

a military department; and the valuable time of a general would be uselessly taken up in explaining details which an officer of the quartermaster general's department could explain equally well.

This is not a mere matter of person or class feeling—a question whether it is or is not beneath the dignity of the head of an administrative branch of the army to take orders or instructions from a staff officer—but it is a vital question, which affects the practical working of the machinery of an army.

I consider that, with regard to such general departmental questions as the following, the controller should receive his instructions from the general commanding in person, without the intervention of any staff officer.

1. The probable duration of a campaign.
2. The probable nature of a campaign.
3. The probable amount of provisions and stores that would be required from home.
4. The source whence transport animals are to be procured, and the means of getting them to the scene of action.
5. Matters relating to the receipt and payment of money.
6. The positions of the main depots of provisions and stores.

Also, in the interior management of his department he should be independent, but in all cases where the operations of the army are in any way concerned, he and his department must act departmentally, and be dependent on, and subservient to, the main objects of the war, which are to be effected by strategic and tactical movements under the direction of military officers.

In the foregoing pages I have alluded only to an army in the field. In time of peace, the present system of making the controller an independent staff officer leads only to a little discontent and friction, and to an occasional blunder, it has to outward appearance no very serious influence over the army. But ought we not, in time of peace, to devise a system which will work in time of war? Let us not slumber in our false security, nor be deceived by the superficial arguments of those who seek only the aggrandisement of their class, little knowing the mischief they are preparing for their country in the event of war. When the tocsin sounds, it is to late to reform.

Where is the use of our peace manœuvres, our studies, our exercises, if our organization is false, our system unstable, and doomed to fall before the crucial test of practice, when jealousy and strife for power must yield to the stern necessities of war?

I will now pass to the organization of the vast administrative department styled "CONTROL."

It appears to me that in the great anxiety to diminish the number of departments, more have been brought together than any one human mind can master; and I do not think it possible that any controller could properly supervise them all, nor give his general correct and detailed information respecting the numerous matters that are now placed under his direction. He would be forced to send for the commissaries in charge of each particular section to furnish the information required: this is virtually a disruption, and a return to the old departmental system under a new title.

I think that all warlike stores, including arms, ammunition, siege-train stores &c., &c., should be placed in a separate department.

I have heard it proposed also to place camp equipments, as formerly, in the same department, and leave transport and supply alone in the control. I think the advantage of this arrangement is doubtful, as camp equipment takes the place of barracks is connected with the personal comfort of the soldier, and is of a very different nature from warlike stores.

Having made the administrative branch of an army "departmental," in all cases where it comes in contact with military considerations, and separated the warlike stores from the present unwieldy mass, the next great question to solve is the arrangement of the transport department—and various are the opinions on this subject. It is, in fact, fraught with great difficulties.

If, on the one side, it was made an independent military corps, it would require a fresh set of internal departments to furnish it with horses, waggons, forage, &c.; or it would be obliged to depend on the control department to do these services for it. There is, moreover, great danger of their becoming too much like cavalry, and of difficulties and friction arising in the performance of their duties connected with the control and store departments.

On the other hand, officers of the control department are not much versed in matters of discipline, and their other duties do not adapt them for the command of men.

Taking all all things into consideration, I am inclined to think that, as the control department must be responsible for the supplies of the army, and that the main object of the transport corps is to convey these supplies and control stores, it should not be separated from that department, but be considered part and parcel of it. I consider that officers should be especially appointed from the army, and trained for that corps, and not be transferable to other branches of the control, and that the officer at the head of the transport corps should be responsible for the discipline of his corps; but I do not think it would be advisable to make him independent of the controller. I am aware that there is a little difficulty in this arrangement, but I do not think it is insurmountable; any other system would endanger the efficiency of the supply branches, for whom the transport corps is principally intended to work.

The next consideration is whether the same transport corps in time of war should work for both the control and warlike store departments, or that each department should have its own transport separately. I am of opinion that the transport of the two corps should be separate.

It may be said that this would be increasing departments, but I do not think any inconvenience would arise from the arrangement. The transport would be part of the organization of the store branch, as the horses are of a battery of artillery, a troop of the engineer train, or a cavalry regiment. Horses might always be transferred at any moment from one department to another, according to the requirements of the war.

There is one other alteration that I should like to see introduced as a regular part of the system of the army, and that is, regimental transport. I think that every corps should transport its own drivers, horses, waggons, &c. The system need not be fully developed in time of peace, but a nucleus of the transport should exist for the sake of practice, and the training of drivers in every regiment.

The horses for the regimental transport should be furnished by the control depart-