lic school or private house, but such as shall be allowed by the Bishop of the Diocese, or Ordinary of the place, under his hand and seal, being found meet as well for his learning and dexterity in teaching as for sober and honest conversation, and also for the right understanding of God's true religion, and also except he shall first subscribe to the first and third Articles"—*i.e.*, "King's Supremacy" and "The Church of England as a true and Apostolical Church." (This Canon was supplemented, if not superseded, by the Act of Uniformity of 1662; and it was only the Act of 9 and 10 Victoria, c. 59, which repealed the section of the Act of Uniformity which imposed the sanction of punishment on those teaching without the license. By 32 and 33 Victoria, c. 56, s. 20, the Endowed Schools Commissioners are to provide in every scheme for abolition of the necessity of having the Ordinary license). The ecclesiastical jurisdiction of school masters by the Bishop was turned into an instrument for the punishment of heresy, rather than the promotion of education; though Bishop Gibson, in his *Codex Juris Ecclesiastici Anglicani*, 1761, says that the licenses to teach school appear without number on the records of particular Sees, as also prohibitions. I may add to this the interesting fact that in the Commonwealth the power of licensing schoolmasters was exercised by the major-generals, and it is needless to add that good affection to the Council of State was a necessary condition of the license. The ecclesiastical aspect has become political, and the pedagogical aspect over-shadowed. I have found a case in which the political side is all prominent in Charles I.'s reign—in 1629. In that year Andrew Bird, head of the Free School at Reading, complains that the Chancellor of the diocese has granted a license to one to teach grammar to the prejudice of the Borough School. "It is," says the King's ordinance, "the King's pleasure that he cause that license to be revoked."

To show how the question of licenses could be made obnoxious to Nonconformists, let us take the case of R. Claridge. Richard Claridge was a Quaker, who in 1707, kept a successful school at Edmonton. Lord Coleraine and another parishioner took exception to the school on the ground that Claridge might proselytize children, and that, at any rate, the school was an eyesore to the vicar, his lecturer, and the master of the Free School. Claridge was cited to appear personally at Doctors' Commons, charged with teaching boys and young men in the rudiments of the grammar and English tongue, and other school-learning, without license in that behalf first had and obtained. This action dropped through; but eight months afterwards, Lord Coleraine put up his footman, Edward Earl, to prosecute Claridge. Earl was a man who was no householder, nor had he any "visible estate"; but he was thought good enough for the purpose. The cause was tried at the Consistory of St. Paul's. Evidence was given tending to show that the prosecution arose from malice and ill-will, and that Edward Earl was not acting of his own initiative, but at "the instance, request and charges of Lord Coleraine." But the case proceeded, whereupon Claridge applied, through his counsel, to the Queen's Bench for a prohibition to stay proceedings in the ecclesiastical court. His counsel argued that teaching school is lawful for any person by the common law; that canons against the common law are void, and that Acts of Parliament and offences against them belong to the judgment of the