28. To enforce payment of a solicitor's costs, taxed upon the petition of the client, entitled in a cause depending, the proper course —under the 92nd order of V. C. Jameson's orders—is by subpœna and attachment, though such costs include costs at law.—McGill v. Sexton, 311.

29. When on the taxation of a solicitor's costs, the master, without any order as to the the costs of taxation, taxed them and included them in his certificate, and a subpœna and attachment issued in due course for the whole amount included in such certificate, and the client remained in close custody for a considerable time under the attachment, before making any application in regard to the supposed error as to the costs of taxation: the court refused to set aside the subpœna and attachment. —*Ib.*

30. Where a plaintiff having obtained the common injunction for want of answer, upon a bill defective for want of parties, the defendant put in his answer and obtained an order *nisi* to dissolve the injunction, before the motion was heard, and on the morning of the day on which it was heard, the plaintiff amended the bill by adding the necessary parties: *Held*, that such amendment was an answer to the objection made on the motion of want of parties; and as the amendment consisted entirely of the addition of parties, and did not materially alter the position of the defendant, and he had not pointed out the objection by his answer; the court refused him the costs of the motion up to the time of the amendment.—Newton v. Doran, 473.

COUNSEL'S OPINION.

31. Where the plaintiff had given a mortgage on a steamboat, and the mortgagee afterwards sold the vessel, and the question was whether he was to be charged with the amount of the purchase money, or merely with certain securities received on the sale in lieu of such amount, the defendant (the mortgagee's executor) admitted the possession of a copy of a letter from the mortgagee, refusing to join in the sale, and an opinion of counsel relating to the same matter, but alleged that these documents did "*not relate to the plaintiff's title or the case made by the bill.*" *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to production, as the plaintiff's case and that of the defendant were, under the circumstances stated, so interwoven and inseparably connected, that nothing could relate to the one without also relating to the other.—Hamilton v. Street, 327.

CREDITOR'S BILL.

32. A large body of creditors may be represented by one or more of the number, but in any such proceeding the bill must disclose a sufficient reason for this departure from the rule of practice, requiring all persons interested to be parties to the suit; where, therefore, a bill by one of several creditors, entitled under a deed of trust, was filed and stated "that the creditors of the said L. entitled to the benefit of the said indenture are too numerous to make it practicable to prosecute this suit if they were all made parties:" *Held*, that such statement was too general to satisfy the court that the rule could not be complied with.—Michie v. Charles, 125.

33. *Quære.*—Whether necessary to furnish proof of the allegation that parties are too numerous to be all brought before the