

Serbia a deathblow, and by my influence to prevent so far as possible public opinion from becoming opposed to Austria. Remembering England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion sympathized with Serbian rights to Bosnia, and her kindly favouring of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one thing and another indicated so strongly the improbability of British support of the proposed punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers, that I felt bound to issue a serious warning. I also sent a warning against the whole project, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous, and advised moderation being urged on the Austrians, as I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.

JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF.

Her von Jagow answered that Russia was not ready, that there would be some fuss, but that the more firmly we held to Austria the sooner would Russia give way. Austria, he said, had already accused us of flabbiness (*flaumacherei*), and so we must not get into a mess. Opinion in Russia, he added, was becoming more and more pro-German, so we must just take the risks. In view of this attitude, which, as I subsequently found out, was the result of Count Pourtalès's reports that Russia would in no circumstances move, and caused us to urge Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy, I hoped for salvation in English intervention, as I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in the direction of peace could prevail. I availed myself, therefore, of my good relations with the British Foreign Minister to beg him confidentially to advise moderation on the part of Russia in case Austria, as appeared probable, should demand satisfaction from the Serbians.

In the beginning the attitude of the English press toward the Austrians was quiet and friendly, as the murder was condemned. Little by little, however, voices increased in number insisting that, however necessary the punishment of a crime might be, no elaboration of it for a political purpose could be justified. Austria was urgently called upon to act with moderation. The whole world outside Berlin and Vienna understood that it meant war, and world war. The British fleet, which happened to be assembled for review, was not demobilized.

The Serbian answer corresponded with British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch

had accepted all but two points, about which he was prepared to negotiate. Had England and Russia wanted war in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been given, and the unspeakable note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian answer with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Government. We even discussed his proposal for intervention, which should insure an interpretation of these two points acceptable to both parties. With Sir Edward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the points under discussion, which were mainly concerned with the part to be taken by Austrian officials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With good-will all could have been cleared up in two or three sittings, and a simple acknowledgment of the British proposal would have brought about a *détente* and further improved our relations with England. I therefore urged it forcibly, as otherwise a world war stood at our gates.

In vain, it would be, I was told, wounding to Austria's dignity, nor would we mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. We left it to our allies. I was to work for the localization of the conflict. It naturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been!

INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS.

After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer (from Berlin) than that it was an enormous "concession" on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.

The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff (Russian Foreign Minister), later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals