sified as industrialized or on the verge of industrialization is an opportunity businessmen do not want to miss.

The Canadian government also wants to divorce trade from ideology if it can, although for domestic political reasons it is trying to maintain an arm's length approach especially towards the military dictators of the southern cone. Trudeau has retained the conservative innovation of a Minister of State for Trade as a means of promoting exports. Visits by a Minister of State to Latin American countries are seen as unobtrusive ways of facilitating the necessary government-togovernment contacts without attracting the undesirable political attention which the Secretary of State for External Affairs, for example, would receive.

OAS membership

The question of whether Canada should become a full member of the OAS has been one longstanding item of Canadian-Latin American concern conveniently buried in this change of direction. For years, and especially during the 1960s, membership in the OAS was the only issue in Canadian-Latin American relations. In 1972, the Trudeau government applied for and received the status of permanent observer to the OAS. During the 1970s, little internal debate occurred within Canada over whether to apply for full membership and there was no visible pressure on the government to join. Historically, Canadians have perceived the OAS as an institution dominated by the United States. We have been reluctant to insert inter-American political rivalries into our relations with the United States. Canadian-American bilateral relations have seemed complicated enough to most Canadians without mixing in hemispheric problems.

With the coming to power of the Clark government, the issue of Canada's membership in the OAS resurfaced for a brief moment. CALA began to beat the drum of full membership as a symbol of Canada's commitment to the Americas and Flora MacDonald, Clark's Secretary of State of External Affairs, was prepared at least to study the possibility more seriously than the previous Liberal government. With Clark's defeat in February 1980, no more has been heard about Canadian membership in the OAS. Canadian diplomats confirm privately that the financial constraints imposed upon the Department of External Affairs have made the cost of membership one of the chief obstacles. The price tag for Canada joining the OAS is estimated at six million dollars, and adding in the cost associated with membership could bring the bill to ten million dollars. With cutbacks in diplomatic personnel abroad and budgetary pressures everywhere, the consensus within External Affairs headquarters is that Canada can find better things to do with her money than spend it on the OAS.

Can the Canadian government pursue an aggressive commercial strategy in Latin America and still retain a commitment to human rights? Mark MacGuigan, in his speech on Canada's Latin American policy last spring, took particular care to reaffirm what he termed "our long, proud record of concern for human rights." He warned that continued abuses would affect "the tone and substance" of Canadian relations with individual Latin American countries. Yet there was little in his speech or in subsequent actions of his government to suggest a tougher line even against the worst offenders, the military dictators of the southern cone.

Canadian business does not want to risk the loss of commercial opportunities in Argentina and Chile and has been counselling the government against any strong pressure on these countries. The businessmen argue that human rights issues can be raised in a general way by the government in appropriate international forums, but they strongly oppose direct open condemnation of specific regimes as harmful to business prospects. Thus the government is caught in a difficult Hobson's Choice situation in Latin America. If it adheres completely to the dictates of business, it cannot even protest human rights violations; if it acts openly to condemn human rights abuses, it may lose potential markets for Canadian business.

Human rights

There is growing public pressure within Canada for a more positive government stance on human rights issues. Trade unions, church representatives, Amnesty International groups and students have vigorously lobbied government and have arranged public meetings in an effort to make Canadians aware of the reality of the appalling human rights abuses in countries like Argentina. The Board of Trustees of Queen's University sent a representative in April to the annual meeting of the Board of Directors of Noranda Mines to attempt to persuade the company to halt its investment program in Chile. To date, there is little sign that these efforts have had much effect. Noranda's investment program is intact and the Canadian government's action has been limited to what it cals behindthe-scenes pressure.

There is little moral consciousness left in the new hard-headed commercial approach to Latin America. The Canadian government goes through the ritual of upholding the cause of human rights in Latin America without much enthusiasm or even a belief that its intervention can do any good. Its real interest has narrowed to questions of oil and trade, securing the supply of the former and expanding the latter. The one common element in the Latin American policies of the short-lived Clark government and the Trudeau government which succeeded it is their open courting of Canadian business. In Canada's Latin American policy for the 1980s, Canadian business will be the piper and the Canadian government shows every indication of being happy to dance to the tune.

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