

Mao uttered the bywords "unity" and "stability". Supporting the third essential of "production", Chou announced a new five-year economic plan calling for "an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system" by 1980, on the way to the attainment by China of its goal of becoming "a powerful modern socialist country by the end of the century".

But actions speak louder than words in the new China. The gathering of party delegates from all over the country in October at the model Tachai Commune in Shansi Province, three months before Chou's death, indicated that agricultural modernization would be the key to industrialization and that the main objective by 1980 would be mechanization of an ancient but increasingly productive agriculture. Simply because agricultural output is the centre-piece of the new Chinese strategy — and the Russians are doing so poorly in this vital field — even Peking's continuing ideological diatribes against Moscow have a practical, down-to-earth quality. As Teng, before he was exiled by the Cultural Revolution, explained the necessity of growing more grain by any means, including material incentives for individual farmers: "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice."

The fact of Teng's taking command with Mao's obvious blessing when President Ford went to Peking last December demonstrates how this pragmatic streak extends to Chinese foreign policy. The Chairman and the Deputy Prime Minister not only lectured Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger about the dangers of *détente* with the Soviet Union — Chinese and U.S. interests "converge," in Kissinger's hardly-noticed account of the talks in Peking, "in the perception of both countries about their relationship with Japan". This amounted to more than Chinese endorsement of the U.S.-Japanese security pact and the U.S. military presence in Korea. China's relations with Japan are economic, and are a keystone of the Chinese leadership's ambitious plan to attain economic greatness by the twenty-first century.

Three-way relation

It is not too much to say, in short, that a subtle but powerful three-sided relation, based on convergent interests, is quickly growing up between China, Japan and the United States.

The end of the Vietnam war having placed Peking and Moscow in more of an adversary relation in Asia than ever be-

fore, the Chinese are unabashedly med on U.S. naval and air power to block ton encirclement. Moreover, they are ambol to buy modern Western military irtly ment and technology to update the old armed forces against any Soviet the a n

With the apparent end of a peatio internal economic uncertainly, cau We least in part, by ideological strain M Chinese leaders are going into debt erta whole factories from Japan. Th No acquiring American technology fo erta development of major on-shore a stal shore oil resources, with the hug nte door Japanese market in mind. tera they are clearly following the Ja it r economic model in planning to er trialize with savings from surplus and ane tural production.

A successful bid for power by logues such as Wang Hung-wen and Ching could upset economic pr again, cause a long political strug involving the People's Liberation Arm even bring about warmer relation Moscow at the expense of carefull vated ties with the capitalist world is not immune to the deep problem nt. ting any developing country (ld thing, population growth does not cul to have been brought under control the risks in the transfer of pow ist hover above any totalitarian gover pa But agricultural growth is impr ass of is successful, it can hardly help but w economic diversification and poli t ernalization. These trends in Ch th unexpected but tremendously gro su boosts to prospects for peace and in non-Communist Asia.

Japanese re-emergence

Japan would have come of age a ga No. 1 non-Communist Asian pow out China's needling trade and tec from the major industrial nation it doorstep more than from any o her e Nor did the Japanese need the en Vietnam war to understand that W ton hardly had anywhere else to go but Tokyo. Moreover, demonstratio clear capability by the Indians, wh Japanese regard as the antitl est scient economic performance, d d n the Government of Prime Mir iste Miki to lose its newly-attained confident stance.

But these developments rein pan's hard-won position 30 years Second World War as a full an partner of the United States n the Pacific. This status does not the usual military strength, no is to. That may be why few W

Ideological diatribes now reflect down-to-earth qualities