

tant segments of the nuclear field, such as the future production of fissionable material and its application to peaceful rather than military uses, which can be subjected to extensive checks and verification. These and other objectives, could in fact be translated into a working agreement on disarmament which would go a long way to reduce tensions, and develop the necessary basis of confidence which would enable us to take further steps when our inspection measures and control techniques are adequate to the task.

(3) The Canadian Government attaches very great importance to the establishment of effective warning systems against surprise attack as an integral part of such a disarmament programme. For this reason, we welcomed the initiative taken at Geneva in July of last year by President Eisenhower and the proposals by Premier Bulganin. We consider that the early application of the procedures envisaged through a reciprocal programme of aerial reconnaissance and observation from control posts on the ground should be an integral part of the early stages of such a disarmament programme. These measures would not only help to lay a basis for the effective control of an agreed programme of disarmament, but would greatly reduce, if not prevent the possibility of surprise attack. Such a reciprocal warning system is needed if we are to move forward from a co-existence based on mutual fear, to the prospect of co-operation based on mutual confidence.

(4) We recognize that in the light of the new positions which have been indicated to the Sub-Committee and which are now before this Commission in the Sub-Committee's Interim Report, the search for a comprehensive programme of disarmament which would fit neatly into an international convention to be concluded at some future date in a happier world should not preclude urgent efforts to reach early agreement on the measures which can be made effective in the immediate circumstances. In other words, time may not be on our side. Without abandoning our ultimate objective of comprehensive disarmament, but without waiting for agreement on the whole of its complex features, the Canadian Delegation considers that an earnest effort should be made in the Sub-Committee to determine what "initial steps" can and should be taken without delay. Such an approach is wholly consistent with the resolution of the General Assembly of December 16, 1955, which urged the Sub-Committee, while continuing their endeavours to agree on a comprehensive plan, to give priority, as initial steps, to early agreement on confidence-building measures as envisaged in exchanges between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin, and to "all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible".

(5) We consider that both in the conventional field and in the nuclear field as well it should be possible now to make an important beginning, under agreed measures of inspection and verification, on reciprocal first-stage reductions of armaments and manpower applicable to the principal military powers and to other states. First-stage measures should provide for reciprocal early warning and for as much progress in the nuclear field as can be agreed between the powers principally concerned. Such an agreement, capable of being carried out in the present state of international relations, would be largely of a stabilizing character, although some reduction in manpower, in material and military expenditure would be possible. The existing balance of power—the relative position of one side to the other—could not be substantially affected, nor would there be any real change in the state of mutual deterrence which arises from the possession by both sides of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, such a limited agreement could serve to stabilize the military situation and strengthen the possibilities for more far-reaching political settlements. Subsequent and more comprehensive disarmament measures could be taken as tensions reduce,