ject which may interest some of our readers.

There may be those who have taken the trouble to estimate the extent to which attorneys and solicitors are the collecting agents for the public treasury, sheriffs, clerks of courts, witnesses, criers, &c. We would draw the attention of those who have not done so, to a recent return made to the Legislature of Ontario, by the Clerk of the Court of Queen's Bench. This return applies only to common law Suits; in Chancery proceedings it is even "more so."

The return we speak of gives an approximate estimate of the average sum paid in law stamps in each suit in the Court of Queen's Bench, as well as an approximate average of the percentage of disbursements in each bill of costs.

For the purpose of the return, Mr. Dalton averaged the costs upon forty judgments; twenty of which were entered upon verdicts, and twenty were judgments recovered at different stages of the suit before verdict. In all cases counsel fees were put down among fees to attorney, and not as disbursements.

The full amount of costs was $3013.64. The disbursements to sheriffs, witnesses, postage, &c., other than stamps, $798.82. Disbursements in stamps, $281.16. Upon this result, therefore, it appeared: (1) that the average sum paid in law stamps in each suit was $7; and (2) that on the average nearly 36 per cent. of such bills of costs was disbursements. The average of disbursements would have been increased if a proper proportion of counsel fees were added to the disbursement column.

The large increase to the fees to Sheriffs, Clerks of County Courts, &c., which has been recently made, will make the percentage of disbursements much larger. It may, with reference to these officers, be advisable to discuss at some future time the propriety of the adoption of some scheme, different from the present one, for remunerating them

## *ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT—CHANGES IN PROCEDURE.*

It is, of course, impossible to predict what will be the course of practice and procedure in the Superior Courts of Law and Equity, whether ultimately the rules which obtain in Courts of Equity will prevail over those of the Common Law, or *vice versâ*. It is manifestly desirable that there should be, as far as possible, and as soon as possible, mutual modifications of practice between the Courts of Law and Equity, so that the systems may, while approximating, be made to work harmoniously together, as auxiliary the one to the other. We doubt not that the Judges of the Common Law Courts will be ready in matters of procedure to adopt the language of Blackburn, J., when he says "We are not bound to follow the rules of the Courts of Equity, but if we saw that their principle was sound and just, we should apply it:" *Elkin* v. *Clarke*, 21 W.R. 447. And so the Chancery Judges will be willing to avail themselves of the rules and practice of Common Law Courts in matters which have hitherto fallen exclusively within the jurisdiction of the latter. The best conceivable thing to be done at the outset, in dealing with the new state of affairs introduced by the Administration of Justice Act, would be for the Judges to unite in framing a comprehensive set of rules or orders for determining the course of procedure under this Act. But so multifarious are the judicial duties, and so great is the pressure of every-day work, that it is well-nigh impossible to secure the requisite leisure for such an undertaking, and so in all likelihood things will be left pretty much to shape their own course. Out of the disorder, no doubt, a system