

but the very much greater number of ships which did not attempt to carry cargoes to Eilat at all because of the risks involved.

The representative of Egypt in replying on February 15, 1954 stated that since October 1951, 267 ships had passed through the Gulf of Aqaba, of which 214 were British and 35 German, while the remainder flew the flags of nine other countries. He stated that only three of these ships were actually visited and searched. The Egyptian position in this case was similar to the position described in section 3 (b) and (c) above.

The New Zealand draft resolution vetoed by the USSR on March 29, 1954, which had to do in the first instance with the removal of restrictions on Suez Canal traffic, closed with a paragraph relating to interference with ships proceeding to the port of Eilat. The concluding paragraph was in the following terms: "(The Security Council) considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of the resolution of 1 September 1951, the complaint referred to in sub-paragraph (b) above (Interference by Egypt with shipping proceeding to the Israeli port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba) should in the first instance be dealt with by the Mixed Armistice Commission established under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel." This draft resolution was vetoed and Egyptian regulations regarding the passage of ships through the Straits of Tiran continued to be applicable until Israel occupied the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula at the beginning of November 1956 and opened the Gulf of Aqaba to all ships, regardless of cargo, bound for the port of Eilat, as well as to all ships bound for the port of Aqaba.

5. (a) The representative of Israel, speaking before the Security Council in defence of Israel's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, said in part on October 30, 1956:

"The object of those operations (the invasion by Israel of the Sinai Peninsula) is to eliminate the Egyptian fedayeen bases from which armed Egyptian units, under the special care and authority of Colonel Nasser, invade Israel's territory for purposes of murder, sabotage and the creation of permanent insecurity to peaceful life... The system of waging war against Israel by fedayeen units is the product of Colonel Nasser's mind... After intensive preparation during the spring and summer of 1955, this new weapon was launched in August of that year, breaking a period of relative tranquillity". (See 2 (c) and (d) above.)

After listing forty separate fedayeen attacks which had occurred between April 20 and October 28, 1956, the representative of Israel went on to say, referring to a longer period of Egyptian hostility:

"During the six years during which this (Egyptian) belligerency has operated in violation of the armistice agreement, there have occurred 435 cases of incursions from Egyptian-controlled territory, 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded. It cannot be seriously suggested that these activities are not the direct responsibility of the Government of Egypt."

Although the greater part of the address of the representative of Israel was devoted to a description of attacks on Israel from Egyptian-controlled territory or by Egyptian-controlled fedayeen operating from bases in various Arab countries, he also drew the attention of the Security Council to (i) Egypt's purchase of large quantities of arms from abroad which in the spring of 1956 "was running most drastically to Israel's disadvantage"; (ii) the theory of continuing belligerency proclaimed by Egypt, under which it "asserts a right to perform hostile acts of its own choice against Israel"; (iii) Egypt's conversion of the Suez Canal "into an instrument for unilateral national pressure, while maintaining a constant violation of international maritime law".

Explaining why the attack on Egypt had been launched at the end of October the representative of Israel asserted that his government "had ample reason to fear that this (fedayeen) activity was to be renewed on a scale unprecedented even during the first wave of fedayeen invasion in August 1955 or during its recrudescence in the spring of 1956". (See also section 2 (c) and (d) above.) It was a fact, he said, "that there have never been any resolutions adopted by the Security Council designed specifically to protect the Israel civilian population against the encroachments and the depredations of the fedayeen units... Following the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in Amman" on the occasion of the signing of a tripartite military agreement on October 24, 1956, "we had stronger reason than ever before to believe that this recrudescence (of fedayeen activity) would take place... The very day after we gave notice of this apprehension, the fedayeen units began to arrive." In 1948 it had taken the Security Council "something like eight weeks" to secure the withdrawal of Egyptian and other Arab armies from Palestinian territory now under Israel's control. Facing "alone" the