

Supply

that this might be available to anyone who is interested. I refer to the testimony presented by Dr. George Lindsey, who was mentioned earlier as being the chief of the operational research and analysis establishment of the Department of National Defence. My colleague, the hon. member for Victoria (Mr. McKinnon), mentioned earlier the matters of stability, crisis and so forth, but I want to show that the view expressed by the dissidents that there is rough parity between the superpowers is not in accordance with the facts.

On February 17, 1982, on the fifty-eighth day of testimony, as recorded at page 10 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence for that day, Dr. Lindsey had this to say:

If we lump long and medium-range systems together and include British, French and United States systems under NATO, then according to this book—

He was referring to "The Military Balance 1980-81," which is a reputable study prepared in Britain.

—the Warsaw Pact leads NATO by 4,400 to 1,300 land-based vehicles, and 2,000 to 650 nuclear warheads available.

Is that rough parity?

Now if you add in sea-based systems, you have to decide whether or not to include the 400 American Poseidon submarine-launched warheads. These are normally declared available to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, but they have already been counted in the central strategic balance. Let us put them in too—

Just for good measure, in order to be sure we know what we are talking about.

—and then the total score is 4,400 to 1,550 for nuclear carriers in favour of the Warsaw Pact;—

That is a pretty big advantage. It is not rough parity, nor is it even rough justice.

Mr. Fretz: Three to one.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich): Three to one.

Mr. Sargeant: That is not true.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich): Someone said that is not true.

Mr. Sargeant: It is not.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich): If the hon. member can produce more reliable figures, not from Arbatov, but from someone else on whom I can rely, I would be glad to have them when I am finished.

Mr. Sargeant: The only guy you rely on is "Ronnie Ray-gun".

• (1710)

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich):

—and in available warheads, Warsaw Pact leads by 2,000 to 1,150. That is a pretty big advantage. But one might wish to break it down into some of the subsystems. In doing that, in land-based vehicles, Warsaw Pact leads 1,250 to 200; aircraft, Warsaw Pact leads 3,100 to 1,100. If you break it down into long-range land-based carriers, Warsaw Pact leads 600 to 18 in missiles, and 1,000 to 250 in aircraft; medium-range, Warsaw Pact leads 650 to 200 in missiles, and 2,100 to 850 in aircraft.

There is no rough parity that I can see there, and how hon. members opposite can see rough parity in these figures, I do not know. The only rough parity I have been able to discover is in the book entitled "The Balance of Military Power" which has a foreword by Dr. Luns, Secretary General of NATO. Mr. Arbatov might not want to rely on this document, but I am prepared to rely on it. The only rough parity occurs in the armed forces, and for the Warsaw Pact they stand at 4,758,000 and for NATO at 4,875,000. So NATO has a slight edge.

I find it strange that from the conclusion that there is rough parity, so-called, it is possible to jump immediately to the question of the freeze. Before I do that, however, I should like to refer to some figures published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. These show the growth of forces from 1970 to 1980 to be just as important historically as the present situation and certain important conclusions may be drawn from this.

In 1970 the U.S.A. had 1,054 ICBMs and in 1980 it had 1,052; in 1970 the U.S.S.R. had 1,487 and in 1980 1,398. In 1970 the U.S.A. had 656 submarine launched ballistic missiles and in 1980 it had 576; in 1970 the U.S.S.R. had 248 and in 1980 it had 950. Is that representative of a move toward rough parity, Mr. Speaker? In long-range bombers the U.S.A. had 512 in 1970 and 348 in 1980; the U.S.S.R. remained steady at 156. The number of total warheads in the U.S.A. went from 4,000 in 1970 to 9,200 in 1980; in the U.S.S.R. from 1,800 in 1970 to 6,000 in 1980.

That disparity in 1970 was not exploited by our allies to the south who are our colleagues in NATO in the way that the head of the Warsaw Pact is trying to exploit the disparity that exists today in order to get a freeze which this group, in its press release, is trying to obtain so that there will be no negotiations. Why should the Soviet Union want to negotiate when these figures show that they are ahead? There is no reason why we should decide on a freeze at this time, Mr. Speaker.

On that subject I should like to refer to what Helmut Schmidt said recently when addressing a Social Democratic Party meeting in Munich.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Ethier): Order, please. I regret to interrupt the hon. member but his allotted time has expired.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich): Just one quotation, Mr. Speaker.

An hon. Member: No.

Mr. Ron Irwin (Parliamentary Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, last evening when I first learned the contents of the motion for today, I reread the minority report on security and disarmament of April, 1982. In large part, my original impression of the report was confirmed. It is a humane report. It sets out the extent of the