

its own methods, whether a state was, in fact, carrying out its obligations under the Convention. This is quite a different matter than promising to supply the United Nations with all relevant information, but unless it were accepted, no one in the present state of international relations would believe that a disarmament pledge was, in fact, being carried out. If the contrary were true, and we could merely accept each other's word, then trust and confidence would be so great that we wouldn't need any disarmament Convention at all.

There is a special form of disarmament referred to in the Soviet resolution, the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for war.

There will be an opportunity later to discuss this vital question in greater detail, but I would like to say a few words about it now, as Mr. Vishinsky dealt with it at some length on Saturday, when he misinterpreted, and thereby misrepresented, the plan for atomic disarmament, which has been approved by the vast majority of the members of the United Nations. He attempted to show that the principle of international ownership of atomic facilities, or international trusteeship, as it really is, would give the United Nations atomic agency "complete unbridled power", that it was designed solely to further the interests of United States monopolies; not merely to limit, but to destroy completely national sovereignty. That is a completely false picture of the meaning and motives of international atomic trusteeship, just as the picture of the Soviet Union as the last-ditch defence of the sovereignty of small nations, including, presumably, Yugoslavia, is false to the point of being ludicrous. How false it is can, and no doubt will, be shown by chapter and verse in our later discussions on this subject.

Mr. Vishinsky has also stated in emphatic, if somewhat ambiguous, terms, the Soviet view on inspection and control.

We all seem to agree now that there must be effective inspection and control. We should surely also be able to agree that once we have a satisfactory international convention which embodies these principles, atomic war must be prohibited. Aggressive war is, of course, the supreme crime, but there should be a defence against that crime which would make atomic warfare unnecessary and therefore criminal; which would make it possible to abolish the atom bomb before it abolishes us.

This can be done as soon as we have an international convention in effect. But that will not happen unless the convention has fool-proof provisions to ensure that the obligations undertaken are being carried out, and until the machinery for that purpose - United Nations machinery - is actually in operation. Mr. Vishinsky has recently tried to remove our doubts on one aspect, but only one aspect of this control, namely inspection. I would like to ask him this simple question. Does the U.S.S.R. admit that any international agreement should include among its provisions - again let me emphasize the word "include" (for inspection itself is not enough) - should include provisions for a strict system of international inspection by which the officials of the international authority would have the right, at any time and with or without consent of the state concerned (a) of continuous inspection of any atomic energy installation or atomic plants of any kind whatever, and (b) to search, by any means, including observation by air, for undeclared atomic energy facilities wherever the international control authority has any reason to believe they exist. This atomic energy question of such critical importance to the fate of the whole world should be given further and urgent examination