

NGOs, therefore, see a need to make security data more transparent. Many believe that whatever military expenditure is visible cannot be justified, especially when compared with the more pressing needs of education, health care, and infrastructural development.

In the concluding section, we present our recommendations from the survey and elsewhere.

- Tension or perceived threats in the Horn region increase the propensity for military expenditure. There is, therefore, a recommendation that non-military aspects of security need to be pursued by promoting peace dialogues. These are less expensive and have a better chance of addressing the root causes of tension, threats, or conflict. Official development assistance should be channelled into peace programs and away from military expenditure.
- Perhaps because NGOs have stayed away from security issues for so long, their recommendations for tying official development assistance to a reduction in military spending are more general than specific. Many see a clear need to reduce military expenditure but are unable to recommend any specific levels. One of the interesting general recommendations is that any rise in military spending should be matched by a similar decline in development assistance. They also propose formation of regional defence forces but at the same time doubt the defence ability of regional bodies such as the OAU.
- The quality of official development assistance can only be improved if it goes into productive sectors.¹⁷ Hardly any of the military expenditure goes to serious research and development to generate any social spinoffs.
- Demobilization and disarmament programs could reduce military expenditure with the support of foreign assistance. The World Bank, for example, supported the demobilization and reintegration program in Uganda. The success of maintaining a

¹⁷R. Jenks and J. Jeavons, "International Development: Cooperation Towards a New World of Partnerships," *The Courier* [Courier?] 156 (March/April 1996), 65-66.