

basic tasks such as monitoring a cease-fire to more complex challenges such as overseeing the demobilization and disarming of entire armies, has involved a peacekeeping force in each case. As a peacebuilding tool, a peacekeeping operation is often the only way which such tasks can be implemented. The neutral and impartial identity of each peacekeeping force is often essential to reassure demobilizing combatants that their adversaries are also demobilizing. Similarly the deployment of peacekeeping forces throughout a country can assist in improving the overall security situation, thus facilitating tasks such as demining and providing humanitarian assistance.

When looking at the six case studies, it is interesting to note that in most cases where peacebuilding efforts failed, the failure occurred within the range of Tier 1 initiatives. In Sierra Leone the government was ousted in a coup and the ARFC/RUF coalition, using forces which were not disarmed in the demobilization and reintegration process, now control the country. In Cambodia, FUNCINPEC is at war with the CPP government and each is using armies which were not demobilized under UNTAC. In Angola, the failings of the Bicesse Accords led to continued conflict.

It is evident that the requirements of physical security initiatives lie solely within the realm of peacekeeping operations. There is no other mechanism which can implement the tasks of demobilization, monitoring cease-fires, and disarming the combatants. This observation does not imply that the failure of peacebuilding recent peacebuilding efforts has been the fault of the peacekeeping component. Instead, what has seemed to complicate the entire peacebuilding process is the desire to implement a variety of Tier 2 and Tier 3 initiatives at the same time. This has meant that the attention of the international community has been divided among a number of different projects, resources have not be directed towards the most crucial peacebuilding initiatives (a la UNAVEM II) and the result has been a series of ineffective and ultimately failed peacebuilding efforts.

Although this study has in part indicated the extreme complexity of peacebuilding efforts with the many problems of timing, implementation and coordination, it also suggests that greater effort should be directed towards recognizing that at different stages of the peacebuilding process some initiatives are more crucial than others. Accordingly, greater attention should be focused on ensuring that Tier 1 initiatives, in particular those within the realm of peacekeeping, be implemented with adequate resources and to such a degree that a solid platform is provided for the implementation of Tier 2 and Tier 3 initiatives.

Canada and Peacebuilding:

In looking at the three Tiers of peacebuilding the one in which there appears to be a Canadian niche is in the implementation of Tier 2 initiatives. This includes the development of government and NGO capacity through the provision of technical support, financial support, and training programs. This has proved to be the crucial elusive second stage of peacebuilding efforts which has not been adequately supplied by the international community. Attention has been focused elsewhere in the peacebuilding continuum, and this has meant that few peacebuilding experiences have been able to progress from Tier 1 through to Tier 3 and a sustainable peace and reconstruction process. In Cambodia the failure to develop adequate