

they had with the original UNITAF plan of "food for guns", that linking disarmament to material compensation was morally repugnant because it amounted to rewarding the militias and the warlords for their mistreatment of ordinary Somali citizens. In the event, UNOSOM II reluctantly abandoned these proposals and developed a new approach with two rather limited objectives:

- minimizing the threat of organized violence designed to advantage one faction vis-à-vis the others; and
- re-establishing as soon as possible some basic institutions of law and order, especially civilian police and the judicial system.

To this end, yet another disarmament plan was devised which called for a staged approach, beginning with the selection and preparation of specific areas or zones for DDRP operations, moving next to the cantonment of heavy weapons and related activities in those areas, then to the actual disarming of all militia and, finally, in stage four to the disengagement of the militias within each of the designated areas. It was in this last phase that nation-building activities by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were to become fully operational. The new plan was warmly received by the UN humanitarian representatives as well as the rest of the relief and donor community who were attracted by its regional focus, incremental approach, and most importantly, the shifting of the main resource burden for humanitarian agencies to the final stage of the process. For the military, the deployment of operational units phase by phase to carry out the disarmament and demobilization tasks, represented a realistic approach given the mission's shortage of manpower and armaments for the tasks at hand.

Implementation began in June of 1993 with UNOSOM II hoping to begin to deal with the seven active heavy weapons storage sites set up under UNITAF and containing large but unspecified quantities of weapons. Although UNITAF had not had a mandate to disarm the militias, its mission to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief called for confiscation of weapons where appropriate. UNITAF had also persuaded the militias in Mogadishu to place their heavy weapons in "authorized storage sites" under their control but subject to inspection by UNITAF. Upon the arrival of UNOSOM II, there was considerable resistance to turning over these stores to UN control. Because of its limited intelligence capability and incomplete information on the sites, UNOSOM II lacked the capacity to effectively monitor them and had become increasingly concerned about the status and safety of these weapons.

On 5 June intelligence reports indicated that weapons were being removed from General Aideed's authorized weapons storage site. To verify these reports, inspection monitoring teams were dispatched to known cantonment sites in South