

control systems underpinned by self-interest (maintaining "our" technological lead) or normative considerations (restricting sales to potential human rights abusers). If the arms trade is largely demand driven, however, such measures are unlikely to succeed, unless they are extremely comprehensive in scope.

On the other hand, arguments that rest upon the fourth hypothesis (that the arms trade is demand-driven) lie behind the momentum to develop and expand regional conflict resolution and confidence-building measures, in such forums as the regional arms control talks associated with the Middle East peace process, or the discussions surrounding a regional Register of Conventional Arms within the Organization of American States (OAS).

A similar analysis can be offered for the three consequences of Figure 1.3. If our only concern is with the inter-state dimension of security, then a stable balance that is achieved at higher levels of armaments is desirable. If, however, the resources devoted to achieving this stable balance thwart economic development or concentrate political power in the hands of the armed forces, then overall security of states and citizens may not be enhanced.

What should be underlined is that the causes and consequences of conventional proliferation (and their possible linkages) present a much more complicated challenge than the relatively straightforward goals of classical arms control.¹ The term "arms control" (as distinct from "disarmament") first came into wide use in the late 1950s, and its underlying purpose was the *regulation or stabilization* of the East-West conflict. Its goals were to reduce the risk of nuclear war, to reduce the destructiveness of war should it break out, or to redirect the resources devoted to armaments to other ends. In practice, East-West arms control concentrated on the first goal almost exclusively, especially since many argued that measures to reduce the destructiveness of nuclear war made "limited" nuclear war more possible.

Compared to the task of constraining conventional proliferation, reducing the risk of nuclear war can be seen as an easy task. Measures such as the superpower Hot-Line lowered the risk of

FIGURE 1.3

Three Possible Consequences of Conventional Proliferation

- Arms transfers fuel regional inter-state arms races and military expenditures, and lead to increased conflict and even war
- Arms transfers can exacerbate internal conflicts, thwart progress towards democratization and good governance, and entrench authoritarian rule
- Arms acquisitions and military expenditures consume scarce resources that could be devoted to social and economic development

¹ For classic statements of the goals of arms control see: Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 2; Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961); *Daedalus*, special issue on arms control, 89:4 (Fall 1960). See also Emmanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization*, 46:1 (Winter 1992), 101-46.