

in recent years with the steadily increasing cost of deploying and maintaining conventional forces.¹

Certain conditions favour the successful conclusion of arms control and disarmament negotiations, such as a desire for agreement by the countries involved in the negotiation and the existence of a measure of confidence.² Recent statements by NATO and the Warsaw Pact leave little doubt that, for members of both alliances, there is a political need to reduce the military confrontation in Europe and enhance stability through negotiation. A measure of confidence does exist, aided by experience in implementing the Stockholm Document on CSBMs. There remains disagreement on the extent of disparities. However, the necessity of asymmetrical reductions, a major preoccupation of NATO countries, has been acknowledged by the Soviet Union. Prospects for concluding a treaty are therefore better than they were at the beginning of MBFR.

A number of other assumptions about East-West security relations are made in the present study:

- mutual distrust can decline only gradually over a long period of time;
- NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to exist for the foreseeable future;³
- the NATO strategy of flexible response may well evolve, as it has done in the past, but deterrence will continue to rest on a mix of conventional and nuclear forces;
- future negotiations on US and Soviet nuclear forces will be bilateral;

¹ For example, the severe economic problems of the Soviet Union have forced it to announce reductions in military expenditure. In addition, the large trade deficit and foreign debt of the United States have led it to become increasingly vocal on the need for burden-sharing among members of NATO.

² For a theoretical analysis of conditions and objectives see Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, New York, Praeger, 1965, Part I, especially chapters 1 and 3.

³ In 1985 the Warsaw Treaty was renewed for another thirty years. The North Atlantic Treaty is of indefinite duration.