

programmes, the otherwise benign technological and economic development plans of advanced non-nuclear powers necessitate their increased and direct involvement in multilateral arms control efforts.⁷

As Thompson and Bissell note, however, multilateral arms control efforts remain “weak” with regard to issues “at the frontiers of military technology, particularly those that can be connected with the research and development programs of the ‘civilian’ sector.”⁸ This technological gap is the fourth of the basic difficulties which continue to confront the CD negotiations. The member states of the CD continue to grope toward the arms control elements of a common security framework. But their collective inability to understand fully the military implications of scientific and technological innovations must help to explain why these states have yet to reach agreement on any arms control accord. In addition to an ever-elusive comprehensive test ban treaty, a chemical weapons convention and a treaty on potentially destabilizing anti-satellite systems have for several years been uppermost on the CD agenda. As this study will show, the superpowers are principally but not exclusively to blame for the failure of the CD to reach agreement on these issues.

⁷ As Julie Dahlitz has claimed, “It is the technological climate that coerces mankind into coordinated activities.” “ASAT and Related Weapons: prospects for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,” *Arms Control: The Journal of Arms Control and Disarmament I* (August 1985), p. 182.

⁸ W. Scott Thompson and Richard Bissell, “Toward a Strategic Conception of Arms Control,” in Luck, p. 41. See also Jonathan Charney, “Technology and International Negotiations,” *The American Journal of International Law* 73(1982), pp. 79ff.