

difficulties over the direction of policy. This collective action, although in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter, represented an expansion of the role that circumstances had led us to expect the United Nations to play. Precedents were set of enormous importance.

The issue was then complicated and made much more difficult by the Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Korean aggressors. This raised the whole question of the way in which the United Nations fulfilled its role as a collective security organization in the event of aggression in which a great power participated.

In these circumstances, the responsibilities of members of the United Nations were ill-defined. On the one hand the pledges set forth in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter applied to great and small powers alike. All solemnly pledged themselves not to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; all pledged themselves to settle their disputes by peaceful means; all agreed that the first purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace".

On the other hand, however, the effect of the rule of unanimity amongst the Great Powers, as embodied in the veto, had led to the realization that the United Nations would not be used as an instrument of collective security in circumstances which involved a Great Power. This assumption seemed to be confirmed by the fact that the Great Powers themselves have failed to agree to measures under Article 43 of the Charter by which the United Nations was to be provided with the means of taking enforcement action. There had, therefore, been no preparation for the collective action which was undertaken to repel the aggression in Korea, nor was there even a clear understanding of the obligations which rested on member states in these circumstances.

The general question of the role the United Nations could play as a security organization in a divided world was thus difficult to answer. The specific question posed in the autumn of 1950 of what action it should take when confronted with the fact of Chinese participation in North Korean aggression was even more difficult.

The aggression in Korea had to be resisted; on this there could be no doubt. But should the resistance in Korea take a form which might lead to limited or unlimited war against China? On this there could be and were grave reasons for doubt and hesitation.

In the first place, the whole philosophy on which the United Nations is founded is that force should be used only as a last resort when all possibilities of settlement by persuasion, conciliation and mediation have been exhausted. Secondly, when the United Nations is compelled in the last resort to use force, it uses only as much force and no more than is necessary to attain its object, suppressing acts of aggression and restoring peace. It was, moreover, clear that the only people who would be likely to profit from a war between the United Nations and China would be the ruling circles in the Soviet Union, and it was these ruling circles which constituted the greatest