

administration, but by the bench. Thus the English politicians do not fear partizan manipulation of the lists by the officials. They undertake the expense of looking after the register not so much with a view to dogging the revisers and keeping them straight, as in order to fight the enemy and to hunt up friendly electors, who have failed to protect their own electoral interests. Possibly it would not be fair to contrast the expenditure incurred in preparing our first Federal lists with that involved in the preparation of the English lists. The first revision was entered upon in the dark and its cost, \$413,000, was larger than the Government could possibly have anticipated. Such a contrast, however, would show that the cost of the lists to the treasury was equal to \$300 for every thousand names, which is \$40 more per thousand than the cost in the English parishes. A fairer contrast would be that of the revision of 1889, which is put down at \$233,000. As there were 1,132,000 names registered, the expense was \$215 per thousand: \$45 less than in the English parishes, and \$75 more than in the English boroughs. Viewing, then, the case of Canada in the light of that of England, it is evident that even were our system so modified as to become a copy of the English plan, thus removing the complaints on the score of official partizanship, suspected or real, there would still remain the objection that the registration is extremely expensive, not only to the state, but also to the opposing parties.

Now, it is worth while to enquire what it is that renders the operation of the law both in England and Canada, so fertile a source of outlay. On the face of it, it is the system of restricted franchises that has been handed down to us by our ancestors. The original theory of the franchise was that the few only, and these, the property owners, were entitled to the right to vote. Naturally, the ruling

classes were jealous of the power they enjoyed and care was taken by them to prevent such a distribution of political strength as should weaken their own influence in the Legislature. They allowed freeholders to vote in the counties, but in the process of time the freeholders became so numerous that it was provided, with a view to reducing the number of electors, that no freehold should carry the franchise with it, unless it was of the annual value of forty shillings—a sum equivalent in those days to an independence. In the boroughs the franchise was fixed not by law, but by custom, and the qualifications varied throughout the United Kingdom. Thus in some boroughs the forty shilling freehold obtained; while in others there was a burgage or occupier's qualification. Again, there was a scot and lot, or tax paying qualification in several; and in one, Bristol, the franchise was conferred not only upon freeholders, but upon such men as were married to the daughters of freemen. The diversity of franchises was provocative of many abuses and it was not until 1832 that something like order or uniformity was produced. But prior to this we had imported the English idea of the franchise. The constitution of 1792 gave to the two Canadas the forty shilling system, each freeholder, however, to have but one vote; and from that starting point we have worked out the complicated arrangement now in operation. Under the Dominion law of to-day the citizen to be qualified to vote, must be the owner or occupier of real property in a city of the actual value of \$300, in a town, of the actual value of \$200, or in the country of the actual value of \$150; or he must pay a rental of \$2 a month, \$12 a quarter or \$20 a year; or he must have an income of \$300 a year, or he must be the son of the owner of property of sufficient value to qualify both father and child. The qualifications are low, so low in-