

CANADA TO THE LAUREATE.

And that true north, whereof we lately heard
A strain to shame us, "Keep you to yourselves,
So loyal is too costly friends you love."
Is but a burden: loose the bond and go.
Is this the tone of Ehiphile?

Zemmyson's last Ode to the Queen.
We thank thee, Laureate, for thy kindly words,
Spoken for us to her to whom we look
With loyal love, across the misty sea;
Thy noble words, whose generous tone may
shame

The cold and heartless strain that said "Be-
gone,

We want your love no longer; all our aim
Is riches—that your love can not increase!"
Fain would we tell them that we do not seek
To hang dependent like a helpless brood
That selfish drag a weary nether down;
For we have British hearts and British blood,
That leaps up eager, when the danger calls!
Once and again our sons have sprung to arms
To fight in Britain's quarrel, not our own,
And drive the covetous invader back,
Who would have led us peaceful keep our own,
So we had cast the British name away,
Canadian blood his dyed Canadian soil,
For Britain's honor that we deemed our own;
Nor do we ask but for the right to keep
Unbroken, still, the cherished filial tie
That binds us to the distant sea-girt Isle
Our father's loved, and taught their sons to
love.

As the dear home of freemen brave and true,
And loving honor more than ease or gold!

Well do we love our own Canadian land,
Its breezy lakes, its rivers sweeping wide,
Past stately towns and peaceful villages,
Mid banks begirt with forests to the sea;
Its tranquil bomeads and its lonely woods,
Whro sighs the summer breeze through pine
and fern.

But well we love, too, Britain's daisied meads,
Her primrose-bordered lanes, her hedgerows
sweet.

Her winding streams and foaming mountain
becks.

Her purple mountains and her heathery braes,
And towers and ruins ivy-crowned and grey,
Glistening with song and story as with dew;
Dear to our childhood's dreaming fancy since
We heard of them from those whose hearts
were sore

For home and country, left and left for aye,
That they might mould, in these our western
wilds,

Now Britain, not unworthy of the old.

We hope to live a history of your own—
One worthy of the lineage that we claim:
Yet, as our past is but of yesterday,
We claim as ours, too, that long blazoned roll
Of noble deeds, that bind, with golden links,
The long dim centuries since King Arthur
"passed."

And we would thence an inspiration draw,
To make our untried future still uphold
The high traditions of imperial power
That crowned our British queen on her white
throne.

Stretching her sceptre o'er the gleaming waves
Ever beyond the sunset, there were some
Who helped to found our fair Canadian realm,
Who left their cherished home, their earthly
all

In the fair borders that disowned her sway,
Rather than sever the dear filial tie,
That stretched so strong through all the tossing
waves.

And came to hew out, in the trackless wild,
New homes where still the British flag should
wave.

We would be worthy them, and worthy thee,
Our old ideal Britain, generous, true,
The helper of the helpless. And perchance,
Seeing thyself in our revering eyes
May keep the worthier of thy ancient name
And power among the nations. Still we would
Believe in thee, and strive to make our land
A brighter gem to light the royal crown
Whose lustre is thy children's—is our own.
CANADENSIS IN GREAT BRITAIN

NAVAL TACTICS.

The article in our last impression on "The
Specialisation of Ships of War," translated
from the *Revue Coloniale et Maritime*, sets
out with the statement that "Lieutenant
Weyprecht and Captain Oesterreicher,
speaking from impressions formed and ex-
perience gained in the combat of Lissa, deny
in toto that any order whatever can be main-
tained during naval engagement in the
present day"; and the writer adds, "prob-
ably the majority of naval officers will coin-
cide in this view." It is chiefly with the
view of showing that this is not so, at any
rate in the case of English officers, that we
now advert to the subject.

First, as regards the battle of Lissa, there
is no doubt that the record of that engage-
ment is sufficiently suggestive of the remark
since the order with which the action began
was speedily succeeded by a scene of con-
fusion more like an engagement between
untutored savages than trained sailors. The
facts are deserving of some attention. The
Italian line of battle, consisting entirely of
ironclads, was formed in three divisions, with
the flagship of Admiral Persano in the rear.
The Austrian fleet advanced to the attack
in three divisions, not ranged in line like the
Italian ships, but echeloned behind one
another. Admiral Tegethoff's flagship led
the first division, which consisted wholly of
ironclads. The two divisions which followed
at equal distances were composed of wooden
vessels. As the Austrian fleet approached
to give him battle, Rear-Admiral Vacca, in
the *Principe de Carignano*, his flagship,
opened fire and the whole of the line follow-
ed his example. Admiral Tegethoff, emu-
lating the example of our gallant Nelson,
broke the Italian line by rushing in between
the *Ancona* and the *Ré d'Italia*. The result
was that the first division of the Austrians,
headed by the *Ferdinand Max*, became sepa-
rated from the rest of the fleet, and the
Kaiser, a two-decked ship of the line, was
surrounded by the smaller Italian vessels,
and appeared: as expressed by a writer in
the *Patrie*, "like some monstrous animal
standing at bay against a pack of hounds."
Admiral Tegethoff, seeing the dangerous
situation of the *Kaiser*, now under an
appalling fire went to her aid, by directing
his own vessel at full speed upon one of the
large Italian frigates which went staggering
away and as she fell off received a broadside
from the *Drache*. At the same moment
the *Ferdinand Max*, seeing the *Ré d'Italia*
about to cross her bows, ran full steam into
her side. A great cry was heard, an im-
mense gulf seemed to open amid the waves,
and then wide spreading circles were seen
upon the surface of the water, which had
again become smooth. The unfortunate
Ré d'Italia had been swallowed up. While
this occurred the entire division which had
passed through the Italian line, had helmed
round and returned to the attack, which
converted the fight into a regular *melee*. All
order was now certainly lost. The *Palastio*
was rammed and set on fire, and subsequent-
ly blew up. The *Affondatore* (Admiral
Persano) manoeuvred to ram the *Kaiser*,
and every time she advanced she was met
by a well directed broadside from the
Austrian flagship. The aim of the Austrians
was always to ram the ships of the enemy
and follow up every blow with broadside.
In these circumstances tactical order was
out of the question, and the Italian fleet
drew off like a herd of frightened oxen in
whose midst a number of frantic bulls were
careerng at full speed. Is it reasonable to
conclude from this experience—the first
action between ironclads, for the engage-
ments in Danish waters were a little more
than reconnaissance—that no order what-
ever can be maintained in a naval engage-
ment in the present day? Were it not more
rational to infer from the experience on
this memorable occasion that the tactics of
the days of Nelson are no longer available
at sea, and that we must rather look for our
model to the galley of warfare of the classic
ages?

The remark upon which we have com-
mented is followed, however, by a pregnant
suggestion. Lines 22 to 31 read as follows
—"With a fleet sub-divided into smaller
portions, each forming a tactical unit by
itself, it would be of great importance to
ascertain what ships should be combined in

each. Should we post together ships
possessing, as far as possible, the same quali-
ties—or, should we choose them so as to
supplement each other, and afford mutual
support? We have as yet been told
nothing upon this point; and yet these in-
terior arrangements are of far greater im-
portance than any general plan of for-
mation for the whole fleet." This touch-
and-go style of treating the matter is unfortu-
nate, so far as regards the utility of the article
referred to; nevertheless, it calls atten-
tion to a very essential point. The "tactical
unit" alluded to has, in fact, been the
subject of discussion among naval officers in
England, by whom it is known as the *peloton*
formation—so called, from a French military
term, designating the group of three infantry
soldiers who mutually support each
other, and in obeying orders: act as one
man. The germ of the idea, as applied to
naval tactics, dates as far back as 1813,
when Ramatuelle published his *Tactique*
Nacale, as mentioned in his lecture on
"Fleet Evolution," by Commander Cyprian
A. G. Bridge, R. N., in February last, "In
the case of a peloton," said Captain Good-
enough, in the discussion which ensued on
that occasion, "you take your three ships
or your four ships in a group, and you con-
sider and treat that group as a single ship.
Theoretically, the ships and group do not
alter their formation. In the group of three,
for instance, you give the leader the charge
of that group; you give the starboard
ship, we will say, a position close by on the
starboard quarter; you give the port ship a
position distant on the port quarter. The
orders those ships have are, in all cases to
maintain those positions, roughly of course,
but still their rallying points are those. A
fleet arranged in groups or pelotons this way
becomes very mobile, inasmuch as you
manoeuvre the group as though it were a
single ship. If you have a fleet of twelve
ships, your signals would be the same as if
you had only a column of four ships; you do
not trouble anybody but the leaders of the
groups, and it is supposed that the men who
are leading each group are picked men,
capable men, who exercise their command
over the small group. The theoretical
effect is that when the group of three is
used, you reduce the chances of error by
two thirds; that is to say, if you make
your signal, whatever it may be to nine
individual ships some of those individual
ships go wrong; but if you address your
signal to three of those ships—the other
ships having merely particular stations to
keep—you run much less chance of con-
fusion and error." Enough is here said to
show that some attention has at any rate been
given in England to the naval tactics of the
future, and perhaps we should not be over-
bold if we averred that the adoption of the
peloton formation by Admiral Persano, at
Lissa, might have forced Lieutenant Wey-
precht and Captain Oesterreicher to a very
different estimate of the lesson taught by
the engagement.

The paragraph on which we have com-
mented goes on to say, in reference to the
"tactical unit" (*peloton*) "it would be of great
importance to ascertain what ships should
be combined in each. Should we post to-
gether ships possessing as far as possible
the same qualities? or should we choose
them so as to supplement each other? &c."
If we may venture an opinion, it certainly
seems that no doubt should be allowed to
exist of the ships that form a *peloton* pos-
singing as nearly as possible, the same quali-
ties, since they have in manoeuvring to
follow the example of their leader. Surely
they ought therefore, to be able to turn in