

on the other side
 ore for the Legis-
 g the minuteness
 faith of the first
 the proof insuffi-
 . In aid of this
 by the principal
 at the trial, could
 itation and birth
 An admission, not
 some of the cases
 on Crimes, 218.
 ag charged with
 n which he ex-
 t wife, who was
 use to the jury,
 statement, made
 er's mind was
 do against him ;
 t is quite clear
 hich a prisoner
 o the considera-

2894, "I have
 upon proof of
 a the presence

l on the same
 ed by the copy
 a prisoner and

urt said, "De-
 l to very little
 y and when it
 , if he did not
 dence entitled

soner had con-
 der a different
 P. Allan. The

first wife hearing of this pursues him. An old acquaintance who had not seen him for seventeen years recognizes and accosts him—with some hesitation he owns that he is the same man—and when asked what made him leave his wife in the States and marry another woman at Parraboro', he does not repudiate the marriage or allege its illegality, he says only that he did not think his wife would follow him from the States ; he thought she never would trouble him, but as long as she had followed him, he would take her and support her as long as they lived.

Here was an admission that satisfied every requisition in *The Queen v. Norton* and the other cases. It was not hastily nor lightly made—it was made when the interest of the prisoner was all the other way—and it is corroborated by the proof of an actual marriage solemnized. A mere admission said Pollock, C. B., 2 *Car. & Kir.* 783, of the first marriage is not enough—you must give some evidence beyond it. Here there is evidence beyond it, so circumstantial and so plain that the objections to a simple acknowledgment no longer apply, and the first marriage must be held, we think, to be clearly established.

And now as to the second marriage.

(His lordship here stated the evidence as to the second marriage.)

This evidence would open a much wider field than we have been hitherto surveying. There is, first of all, the question whether the second marriage must be equally valid with the first, on which there are various opinions. Then would come the far more important question, whether this second marriage solemnized by a Presbyterian minister stands on the same footing in this country as a marriage in presence of a clergyman episcopally ordained. On this cardinal point—that is, on the extent to which the common law as it has been declared by the House of Lords in the case of *The Queen v. Millis* is to be accounted the common law prevailing in this Province—or whether we have the power of limiting its operation as has been done by the Courts of New York, Pennsylvania, and others of the United States—these are very large and important questions, on which it is unnecessary and would be improper for me to enter, as differences of