

ness really are, *i.e.*, to analyze them into their elements, etc., and to discover under what conditions—qualitative and quantitative—these facts arise and combine with one another. In addition to these positive statements it may be well to call attention to the fact that experimental psychology and physiological psychology are not identical. The latter is an attempt, now from the side of psychology, now from the side of physiology, to correlate mental and physiological facts. It is in no sense an *explanatory* science. It must fail completely if it attempt to “explain” either the mental by the physiological or the physiological by the mental. To correlate these two realms, and that only, is its work, and hence it might just as well be called psychological physiology—as indeed in connection with the sense organs and their functions it essentially is—as physiological psychology, which it happened first to be called.

One of the great difficulties in experimental psychology is the discovery of scientific methods by which the more complex facts of consciousness may be investigated. It is evident that such methods may be found for the investigation of sensation much more readily than for the investigation of memory, reasoning, volition, etc., and so it came about that sensations were investigated first, and that exact research in the realm of the complex facts is still largely a matter of the future. The failure to discover methods offers, however, no foundation upon which it may be urged that these facts are not open to experimental research. Just as the physicist has stood and still stands before many problems in hope that the desired methods of research may be found, and yet never doubts of the possibility of investigating all facts in the physical world, so the psychologist stands before the complex facts of consciousness and believes, as he has a right to believe, that no fact of consciousness is by its nature above or beyond the possibility of experimental research. The achievements of psychology at the present day are, therefore, not to be taken as the measure of what it can do, but rather merely as an indication of the direction in which its work lies. Our subject is, accordingly, not What has experimental psychology contributed to a theory of education? but rather What is it by its very nature calculated to contribute to such a theory? It, therefore, involves the question, In which direction should the philosopher, who is con-

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