

WEST INDIES.

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of things which we have shown to exist would be the abandonment of the bounty system by continental nations. This change would in all probability enable a large portion of the sugar-cane cultivation to be carried on successfully, and would certainly reduce the rate at which it will diminish. Looking, however, to what appears to be the policy of the United States of America, to the great cheapening of the cost of production of beet sugar, and the fact that many countries appear to have singled out the sugar industry as one which ought to be artificially stimulated in various ways, it is not clear that, even if the bounties were abolished, another crisis of a similar character might not arise in the West Indies at a future day.

"h. A remedy which was strongly supported by witnesses interested in the West Indian sugar estates was the imposition of countervailing duties on bounty-fed sugar when imported into the United Kingdom. . . .

"i. The special remedies or measures of relief which we unanimously recommend are—(1.) The settlement of the labouring population on small plots of land as peasant proprietors. (2.) The establishment of minor agricultural industries, and the improvement of the system of cultivation, especially in the case of small proprietors. (3.) The improvement of the means of communication between the different islands. (4.) The encouragement of a trade in fruit with New York, and, possibly, at a future time, with London. (5.) The grant of a loan from the Imperial Exchequer for the establishment of Central Factories in Barbados. The subject of emigration from the distressed tracts also requires the careful attention of the various Governments, though we do not find ourselves at the present time in a position to make recommendations in detail.

"j. We estimate the cost of the special remedies recommended in (2) (3) and (4) of i, at 27,000/- a year for ten years, the expenditure to be borne by the mother country. We estimate the amount of the loan to Barbados for the erection of central factories at 120,000/. This measure no doubt involves the risk of loss. Grants will be required in Dominica and St. Vincent for roads, and to enable the settlement of the labouring population on the land to be carried out, and their amount may be taken at 30,000/. A further grant of about 60,000/- is required to clear off the floating debt in some of the smaller islands. In addition, the smaller islands should receive grants to enable them to meet their ordinary expenditure of an obligatory nature. The amount may be placed at 20,000/- a year for five years, and possibly a reduced amount for a further period of five years. The expenditure which we are able to estimate may be summarized as follows:—(1.) A grant of 27,000/- a year for ten years. (2.) A grant of 20,000/- a year for five years. (3.) Immediate grants of 30,000/- and 30,000/-, or 60,000/- in all. (4.) A loan of 120,000/- to Barbados for the establishment of central factories."

On a proposal for the federation of the West India colonies the Commission reported unfavorably, for the reason that the colonies are too widely scattered and differ too greatly in conditions for an efficient or economical common government. "Nor does it seem to us," says the report, "that the very important Island of

Jamaica, which is separated by many hundreds of miles of sea from all the other West Indian Colonies, could dispense with a separate Governor, even if there should be a Governor-General; whilst the circumstances of British Guiana and Trinidad almost equally demand the constant presence and attention of an Administrator of Governor's rank. It might be possible, without disadvantage, to make some reduction in the number of higher officials in the smaller islands, and we are disposed to think that it would be conducive to efficiency and economy if the islands of the Windward Group, that is, Grenada and the Grenadines, St. Vincent and St. Lucia, were again placed under the Governor of Barbados, as they were for many years previous to 1865. We are also disposed to think that the Island of Dominica, which is not much further than Grenada from Barbados, and which, in its physical, social and industrial conditions partakes more of the character of the Windward Islands than of that of the other Leeward Islands, might be placed under this Government instead of being considered one of the Leeward Group. It might, indeed, be found possible to bring the whole of the Leeward Islands under the same Government as Barbados and the Windward Islands, and thus effect a further economy."—*Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications (Papers by Command: C.—8655, 1897, pp. 69–70, end 23).*

With the sanction of Parliament, most of the recommendations of the Commission were promptly carried out. Provision was made for the construction of roads in the islands; for subsidising steamer lines between the several islands and between Jamaica, Canada and London; for developing the cultivation of fruits and other crops by a botanical department; for establishing model factories for the better and cheaper working of sugar cane; and for wiping off certain debts which were a cause of distress to some of the poorer islands. In these measures the imperial government undertook obligations which, it was said, involved the payment of £200,000.

**A. D. 1899–1901.—Reciprocity arrangement with the United States.** See (in this vol.) UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1899–1901.

**WESTERN AUSTRALIA.** See (in this vol.) AUSTRALIA; and CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRALIA.

**WEYLER y NICOLAU, General:** At Barcelona. See (in this vol.) SPAIN: A. D. 1895–1896.

**Administration in Cuba.** See (in this vol.) CUBA: A. D. 1896–1897.

**Appointed Captain-General of Madrid.** See (in this vol.) SPAIN: A. D. 1900 (OCTOBER–NOVEMBER).

**WHEATON, General: Military operations in the Philippine Islands.** See (in this vol.) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1890 (JANUARY–NOVEMBER).

**WHITE, Andrew D.: American Commissioner to the Peace Conference at The Hague.** See (in this vol.) PEACE CONFERENCE.

**WILDMAN, Rounseville: Report of proposals from Philippine insurgents in 1897.** See (in this vol.) UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1897 (NOVEMBER).