

reviewer discovered, in a brisk wind — but it is a good guess that any reader of this book will be attentive.

Foreign offices, it has been remarked, have no secrets: the dictum of A.J.P. Taylor is, on the whole, sustained by *Time of Fear and Hope*. Its readers may not have known beforehand that, prior to the general election in Italy in March 1948, the then director of the U.S. State Department's policy-planning staff recommended leaning on the Italian Government to outlaw the Communist Party, so as to provide an excuse for American military intervention in the civil war sure to follow. (General Marshall did not act on this suggestion — wisely, one would think.) But for the most part, readers will find these pages useful for their detailed confirmation of what in general outline is already known.

Students of Canadian foreign policy, for example, will find additional evidence for believing that Canada's early interest in and unflagging pursuit of a North Atlantic treaty bringing the United States into a military alliance with Britain and the countries of Western Europe is to be explained by the uneasiness of its officials at the alternative prospect of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and the United States. As Norman Robertson cabled trenchantly from London in April 1948: "A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified with our special relationships with other countries in Western Europe and in which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably militarily, for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to me such a providential solution for so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great lengths and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership" (132). Just so.

Writing at that time, the U.S. Secretary of Defense observed, on visiting Ottawa, that Canada "is equally as strong as [*sic*] Britain for the formation of the alliance", pronouncing this a "curious fact". There was nothing curious about it, and the use of the word betrays American obtuseness about Canadian hope. As Reid puts it succinctly: "The alliance would contain the United States as well as the Soviet Union" (139). That, however, is written with hindsight.

The author justifiably cites the passage in his speech to the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs on August 13, 1947,

as early advocacy of the Atlantic alliance, perhaps even the earliest: "This may be the first public statement advocating a collective defence organization of the Western world". However, an earlier speech (which Reid could well have drafted) delivered by Pearson at the University of Rochester on June 16 had tentatively put it forward: "If mutual tolerance between two basically opposed forms of society within the United Nations should prove impossible, the nations of the West would then have to decide whether to adjust their pace to that of the slowest member, or to go ahead to a really effective international order with those states who are really willing to co-operate".

Reid's speech at Lake Couchiching made Pearson's passage much more explicit by its reference to "an organization [in which] each member state could accept a binding obligation to pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of the other members if *any* power should be found to have committed aggression against any one of its members". Despite the disclaimer that Reid added ("I am not saying that the time has come when these things ought to be done"), his words were regarded as highly controversial, and their author took the precaution of clearing them with Pearson who (he now knows) took the precaution of clearing them with Louis St. Laurent. We are not told, however, whether St. Laurent took the precaution of clearing them with Mackenzie King. The Prime Minister, whose mood had become not so much one of fear and hope as one of fear and trembling and whose responses were by then erratic, might easily have ordered the key passage deleted from the text or even the cancellation of Reid's speech.

The author omits from this account a rather telling detail provided by him in a version published in 1967: "Mr. Pearson gave me permission, but suggested that it would be just as well if this particular passage were omitted from the copies of the speech given to the press at the conference". If so inconspicuous a *ballon d'essai* was unlikely to get shot down at once, it was unlikely to get much attention, either. Nor did it, hovering aloft for several days without attracting any attention at all, then drifting out of sight. The Department of External Affairs then decided to publish the speech as delivered, including the controversial passage, in its series of mimeographed press releases *Statements and Speeches*. Thus was the grand design revealed to the world. Quiet diplomacy indeed.

*Reid's speech at Couchiching made explicit Pearson's message at Rochester*